> That is, is a "cleaned" system vulnerable to a USB device?

of course it is, because the USB DCI attack is one level below the Intel ME. Even if it is deactivated via HAP, which basically simply puts the ME code into an infinite loop or a CPU halt state - both can be reversed by JTAG.

I don't know, because there is very little detail about what this attack is and how it works. It looks like they managed to thwart whatever protections exist in the USB DCI (Direct Connect Interface)[1] which is a debugging system for Intel chips.

If they have full debugger access to what's running in Intel ME then removing the code from the firmware probably doesn't make a difference (assuming they can run un-trusted code in that context). If they cannot write their own code and so an attack requires ROP gadgets then removing the code might make it harder (or impossible) to do, but I doubt it.

[1]: http://www2.lauterbach.com/pdf/directory.pdf#M8.newlink.DIR6...

DMA/Firewire over USB makes pretty much every systen vulnerable to USB attacks (ME aside.)

DMA-based attacks are blocked by the IOMMU, which is present in all modern machines (and has been for a few years). Linux has preferential enablement of DMA such that the IOMMU is initialised first, so even plugging in a device in early boot will not be able to exploit DMA.

Does it? To use the IOMMU for VFIO, I had to explicitly enable it via a kernel parameter.