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Re:Simplicity: A New Language for Blockchains [pdf] by naasking on Tuesday October 31, 2017 @01:25PM (#15594882)
You're neglecting the vulnerabilities associated with full abstraction failures: http://lambda-the-ultimate.org/node/5364

Approaches like your (2) are unfortunately fraught with easy vulnerabilities.

Re:Simplicity: A New Language for Blockchains [pdf] by cousin_it on Tuesday October 31, 2017 @02:24PM (#15595358)
That doesn't seem like an argument against (2). You're just making the reasonable point that linking your code with someone else's unverified code is a bad idea.
Re:Simplicity: A New Language for Blockchains [pdf] by naasking on Tuesday October 31, 2017 @02:54PM (#15595611)
"Unverified code" isn't the problem, because a module could do exactly what it's verified to do. The problem is that the underlying execution model exposes capabilities that the high-level language cannot represent. This lets attackers silently violate invariants that your language is supposed to enforce.

For instance, at one point on the CLR you could throw an object of any type, it didn't have to inherit from System.Exception. But the C# compiler required you to inherit from System.Exception, so a properly crafted callback from a "malicious" module could escape the your C# program's control-flow by throwing an exception that you couldn't catch.

There are loads of full abstraction failures in the JVM and other languages. So if your cryptocurrency VM can execute arbitrary programs, but your surface language is a non-Turing complete language, unless you're very, very careful, you're virtually guaranteed to introduce vulnerabilities due to full abstraction failures.

This property is incredibly subtle, so I wouldn't discount it so easily, particularly when there's so much money involved.