Murder also hurts property values. Fortunately, we have the ability to create laws to punish destructive behavior.
Why would a landlord destroy the value of their own property, harming their own ability to draw rent?
They haven't. That's why taxing land value at a higher rate than property values doesn't have support from mainstream economists.
> Murder also hurts property values. Fortunately, we have the ability to create laws to punish destructive behavior.
Murder is a lot easier to identify and prosecute than blighting. We already have laws against blighting. They don't seem to work. Increasing the incentive to blight is unlikely to make blighting less attractive.
> Why would a landlord destroy the value of their own property, harming their own ability to draw rent?
You're missing the point. They wouldn't destroy the value of their property; they'd extract value from the land (and neighboring land) to build up the value of their property. Land-value taxes encourage consolidating wealth in improvements to private property that have zero impact on anybody other than the property owner (or tenant). That's the exact opposite of the desired outcome, because it clearly works against the public benefit.
There are plenty of areas where this already happens, because there's enough of an incentive for property owners to do this even without skewing the tax code specifically to reward them for this behavior.
I admire the cashflow of trailer parks, and the ease to remove and replace distressed properties.
When land value is taxed at a higher rate than property value, it creates a perverse incentive for landlords - especially those who don't live in the area in which they own property - to encourage blighting and sabotage the value of the land, while instead reinvesting this money into improvements on the property itself. That concentrates wealth even further in the hands of people who can afford to own these insular properties in otherwise "undesirable" areas.
Actively blighting a neighborhood to depress values and make it easier to purchase land for new properties (either on the market or via eminent domain) is already a problem, and one that significantly skews power towards the extremely wealthy and massively-capitalized institutions. Taxing the value of the land separately from the property that sits on it (and at a higher rate) would exacerbate this unbelievably.