I shared the LTSA model with a few others at the time, but no-one else seemed very interested in doing anything with it.
https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/ltsa/
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4340
Edit: I dug through my old backups, and I think this is probably the model I used:
http://nrg.cs.ucl.ac.uk/mjh/dccp.lts
It's nothing fancy, but my point is that even simple modelling can spot errors that a whole standards group of smart people miss.
That must be the origin of all the useful but unofficial SVG ones I'd seen :)
Beurdouche et al., "A Messy State of the Union: Taming the Composite State Machines of TLS"
From the abstract: "mplementations of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol must handle a variety of protocol versions and extensions, authentication modes and key exchange methods, where each combination may prescribe a different message sequence between the client and the server. We address the problem of designing a robust composite state machine that can correctly multiplex between these different protocol modes. We systematically test popular open-source TLS implementations for state machine bugs and discover several critical security vulnerabilities that have lain hidden in these libraries for years ..."
Based on this work you might say that there are formal state machines for TLS, but they aren't in the standard.