There's no need for a second AP in all this, just someone in range of the client who can replay packets to the clients.
(Good TLDR here: https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2017/10/16/falling-... )
How would you drop packet 3 without a new AP?
> Note that the adversary cannot replay an old message 3, because its EAPOL replay counter is no longer fresh.
And a related update from the TLDR post you originally referenced (which I believe is causing confusion):
> Update: An early version of this post suggested that the attacker would replay the message. Actually, the paper describes forcing the AP to resend it by blocking it from being received at the client. Thanks to Nikita Borisov for the fix.
The client is tricked into moving to what it thinks is the same WiFI network running on a different channel, but is actually the attackers network instead.
> The attacker doesn't need to know the WPA2 password but it accepts the connection setting the encryption to zeros.
The attacked doesn't need to know the WPA2 password and (for Android and Linux clients) the client then defaults to an encryption key of all zero bytes.
> The client thinks it is connected to the original wifi network and continues as normal.
Yes.
> Wifi traffic is intercepted and unencrypted.
Wifi traffic is intercepted and can be decrypted (since the encryption key - all zero bytes - is now known).
The client is forcibly disconnected from the WiFi network and reconnects to the attackers network instead.
The attacker doesn't need to know the WPA2 password but it accepts the connection setting the encryption to zeros.
The client thinks it is connected to the original wifi network and continues as normal.
Wifi traffic is intercepted and unencrypted.