Pushing through protocol changes could be hard if everyone who takes the default action of doing nothing is counted as a vote against any protocol change. I think we see this with bitcoin where change is very conservative and slow because any change has to gain enough support to be actively upgraded by a majority.
The difficulty bomb just means that if there is ever disagreement about a protocol change, everyone will have to actively choose a side rather than the 'no' side getting all the non-active default votes.
It basically just means that changes can be done faster.
No, this just shifts the do-nothings from 'no' to 'yes', as they will have to actively create something that will let them stay with what they currently have. It is technically and morally dangerous because most people aren't technical enough to understand what they are being forced to accept.
With a future difficutly bomb in the current implentation, when a proposed hard fork from the ethereum team is approaching you have 3 options:
1) You do nothing (you don't vote - the default) - You'll end up on the chain that eventually get's it's difficulty scaled up and will die. You will not be able to continue running this chain practially after this point.
2) You agree with the fork (a yes vote) - You need to actively install the update.
3) You disagree with the fork (a no vote) - You need to activly install a competing patch to remove the bomb.
(Assuming we are talking about a widely controversial fork, not just something that you alone oppose. I'm not talking about having to create a patch yourself. I'm talking about the situation where there are two competing sides, both creating their own patches. So the difficulty involved with voting either way is exactly the same, just pick a side and installing their update.)Having the difficulty bomb guarantees that (eventually) all users post fork must have actively made a concious choice one way or the other and upgraded. The users that do nothing are guaranteed to end up on a dead chain, and hence have not cast a vote in either direction.
I'm not sure how that can be interpreted as the do-nothings casting yes votes. Anyone who does nothing becomes no part of any future chain.
> Accountable safety is what brings us this idea of “economic finality”: if two conflicting hashes get finalized (ie. a fork), then we have mathematical proof that a large set of validators must have violated some slashing condition, and we can submit evidence of this to the blockchain and penalize them.
Why would the validators, who decide what goes into blocks, willingly include a proof that they have cheated?
As far as I can see, these proofs must be communicated out-of-band (not through the blockchain) by nodes, since no validator would ever incriminate itself by including a proof that it has cheated.
How do nodes coordinate this, and come to agreement on which chain is the right one?
[1] https://medium.com/@VitalikButerin/minimal-slashing-conditio...
E.g. let’s say I take the main chain, go back to the first block past the latest checkpoint, and remove the competing staking-transactions so that only my staking-transaction is present in that block. The I build on top of this, without competition, because I can selectively remove competing staking transactions simply by constructing new blocks that don’t contain them.
Let’s say hundreds, or thousands, of stakers do this. How do nodes decide which chain is the right one?
This is Vlad Zamfir's version; Vlad is the lead Casper esearcher, and takes a more long-term theoretical approach, while Vitalik is more focused on near-term practicality. Vitalik's version doesn't penalize dropping offline as heavily; I don't know whether there's some other mechanism to cover this, or he just thinks a lighter penalty is sufficient.
Thanks for the question! Until now I didn't realize the reason for the offline penalty.
"It solves the long-range problems with proof of stake by relying on human-driven social information, but leaves to a consensus algorithm the role of increasing the speed of consensus from many weeks to twelve seconds and of allowing the use of highly complex rulesets and a large state. The role of human-driven consensus is relegated to maintaining consensus on block hashes over long periods of time, something which people are perfectly good at. A hypothetical oppressive government which is powerful enough to actually cause confusion over the true value of a block hash from one year ago would also be powerful enough to overpower any proof of work algorithm, or cause confusion about the rules of blockchain protocol."
https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/11/25/proof-stake-learned-lov...
And if you have trusted checkpoints I fail to see the point of proof-of-stake (or proof-of-anything really). Just call every block a checkpoint and you're done.
Any remaining use cases probably centers around availability, but we know how to build highly available systems and can build them to any degree. Trustless and decentralized systems are much harder.
I wonder if the planned switch to proof-of-stake is ever going to happen.
In any case, what's the point of continuously postponing a pre-programmed difficulty bomb (via a hard for), when miners can just remove this part from the code and continue with that fork if they wish? Because of this, it seems like it doesn't do much difference compared to just switching to PoS via a hard fork whenever it's ready. I mean, if miners really want to continue with PoW, removing those couple of lines, that define the difficulty time bomb, from the Ethereum code surely won't be a problem, right?