Using in-web-page crypto gives users a false sense of security. This is, I believe, a very real problem.
What WebCrypto guarantees is that it is truly Mozilla's code that you're trusting, since the WebCrypto APIs are only available in a secure context (HTTPS or localhost).
No, because I use the Debian Firefox, which means that I'm trusting the Debian Mozilla team. I feel much better about that than about directly trusting Mozilla themselves.
I don't trust auto-updates.
About the auto-updates. CCleaner recently had an incident where their version .33 something had a backdoor injected by some 3rd party. If you downloaded version 34 you were safe. If you loaded 32 and configured it auto-update you got the malicious update. But that didn't affect the auto-update setting as far as I know, so if you had it on you would in about 2 weeks time have gotten an automatically fixed clean version.
Point: The worst situation was if you did not have auto-updates on and downloaded v. 33. Then you were stuck with that until somebody told you you had malice on your machine.
You're damned if you do and damned if you don't.
https://www.piriform.com/news/blog/2017/9/18/security-notifi...
That's reasonably for a technically savvy user, but the vast majority of users do not use Debian. They use Windows or OSX and rely on trusted corporations like Apple, MSFT, Google, and Mozilla to keep their systems patched.
Which is still a bad idea to trust, so I'd say that it is a logical extrapolation.
I mean, sure, you can never use an auto-updating application again and always manually review system updates before installing them. But realistically, I don't see anyone besides Richard Stellman adopting that lifestyle.
Not if you're using a Linux distribution's browser packages (we patch out the auto-update code because you should always update through the package manager). And distributions build their own binaries, making attacks against builders much harder.
While people might trust auto-updating applications, they really shouldn't. And there are better solutions for the updating problem.
Sure, nobody ever said otherwise. But that doesn't mean it's a good idea.
The software I use is open-source, so I can see what I'm running, and what updates I get. I also don't use any auto-updates. The web is inherently different in that I can't really guarantee that the code I get is going to be the same code that you are getting.
For most people your advice is quite plainly wrong. Most people should have everything on autoupdate.
Or you can auto-update to a version which is malicious. Then you are screwed. But your previous version you downloaded to start with might have contained the threat to start with. So just saying don't auto-update does not really protect you from malicious versions. Auto-updating does mean that you get updated security fixes making you less vulnerable.
The original non-updated version can be malicious even with a vendor you think you should be able to trust because it is a popular product used by many others:
https://www.piriform.com/news/blog/2017/9/18/security-notifi...