Meanwhile, as soon as you publish a vulnerability, responsible network owners can make integrity vs. availability tradeoffs, even without manually managing a patch. Somehow, as an industry, we've come to the conclusion that nobody can shut a service off, even in response to a lethal security vulnerability. Better that we risk our customers data than violating an SLA. That's messed up.

But this isn't about shutting off a service to protect a company's bottom line. This is a vuln affecting consumer devices. SLA has nothing to do with it. People's home networks and devices, not to mention a myriad number of embedded devices and sensors all over the world, are going to be affected by this - not corporations protecting customer data. Affected consumers have no means to patch themselves. Releasing this before vendors could generate patched packages or firmware is just monumentally irresponsible.

This would be preposterous reasoning if it weren't overwhelmingly normalized in our industry. It's an embarrassment for the whole field.

What you seem to be suggesting is that we should simply all disconnect from the internet until vendor patches can be prepared, the reason being it's better to stop any potential and unknown exploits going on now, than stop the hundred-fold new exploits that absolutely will follow its public announcement.

You mean if hundreds of the popular vendors were notified for a coordinated release? And you think that's not making the exploit effectively public? Even skipping possible monitoring of emails, I don't expect that the set of blackhats and employed security engineers have no common elements.