Re:How the Catalan government uses IPFS to sidestep Spain's ...
by kilburn on Friday September 29, 2017 @03:45PM
(#15368509)
The code is in the bundled file at [1] (look for the "calcular" function).
The hash was distributed in URL form through twitter by both the Catalan president [2] and the catalan economy minister (who is the 2nd in command actually) [3].
[1] https://ipfs.io/ipns/QmZxWEBJBVkGDGaKdYPQUXX4KC5TCWbvuR4iYZr...
Also how are they distributing the initial hash - physical signs? I figure the easiest threat from Spain is to get people to show up to the wrong polling stations, which don't have them on the voter rolls, and then cast doubts on the validity of a referendum that has a huge number of provisional ballots. Since you don't actually need to staff polling stations, this attack only really requires a single person setting up a cloned website and distributing a different hash (although it gets easier if e.g. the postal service is willing to help you send out the wrong hash).