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Re:How the Catalan government uses IPFS to sidestep Spain's ... by kodablah on Friday September 29, 2017 @03:28PM (#15368361)
> that cannot be censored

I am not familiar with IPFS internals, but is there no pattern to the IPFS traffic that the ISPs can shape/block?

Too bad about the entire IPFS domain being blocked, because besides the host, HTTPS traffic has safety in numbers. If only there was a way to proxy through google.com or some other popular domain too important to block.

Re:How the Catalan government uses IPFS to sidestep Spain's ... by tonyztan on Friday September 29, 2017 @08:21PM (#15370367)
> If only there was a way to proxy through google.com or some other popular domain too important to block.

There is. Domain fronting is used in China to circumvent the Great Firewall. The concept you are talking about is collateral freedom.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_fronting

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collateral_freedom

Re:How the Catalan government uses IPFS to sidestep Spain's ... by lgierth on Sunday October 01, 2017 @11:39AM (#15378322)
Thanks for mentioning domain fronting! It's also been used by Signal to circumvent communications censorship in Egypt [1]. We want to bring domain fronting to IPFS by making libp2p's websockets transport capable of it. [2]

Fun fact: advanced networking setups like domain fronting are impossible to address in a URL/URI scheme. Check out multiaddr :) [3] A domain-fronted service could be addressed as something like `/dns4/google.com/tcp/443/tls/sni/google.com/http/example.com/ws`

[1] https://signal.org/blog/doodles-stickers-censorship/

[2] https://github.com/libp2p/libp2p/issues/18

[3] https://github.com/multiformats/go-multiaddr

Re:How the Catalan government uses IPFS to sidestep Spain's ... by toomuchtodo on Friday September 29, 2017 @04:23PM (#15368811)
> If only there was a way to proxy through google.com or some other popular domain too important to block.

Host IPFS nodes with http proxies on GCP and point the domain with multiple A records at those instances?

Re:How the Catalan government uses IPFS to sidestep Spain's ... by confounded on Friday September 29, 2017 @04:37PM (#15368954)
This is basically how Signal avoid being blocked in (IIRC) Saudi Arabia.
Re:How the Catalan government uses IPFS to sidestep Spain's ... by SEJeff on Friday September 29, 2017 @05:08PM (#15369222)
Yup.

The magic term for others to google is "domain fronting". Here is a bit more info:

http://www.geektime.com/2016/12/23/signal-updates-protect-th...

Re:How the Catalan government uses IPFS to sidestep Spain's ... by confounded on Friday September 29, 2017 @07:52PM (#15370249)
Ah, too late to edit, but it was Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (apologies).
Re:How the Catalan government uses IPFS to sidestep Spain's ... by samstave on Friday September 29, 2017 @05:03PM (#15369191)
More info please
Re:How the Catalan government uses IPFS to sidestep Spain's ... by finnn on Friday September 29, 2017 @05:14PM (#15369279)
Re:How the Catalan government uses IPFS to sidestep Spain's ... by samstave on Friday September 29, 2017 @05:28PM (#15369390)
You cheeky bastard... but thank you.
Re:How the Catalan government uses IPFS to sidestep Spain's ... by zardo on Friday September 29, 2017 @05:30PM (#15369404)
IPFS is P2P and very delay tolerant. It can run on a sneaker-net.
Re:How the Catalan government uses IPFS to sidestep Spain's ... by TeMPOraL on Friday September 29, 2017 @04:08PM (#15368698)
They'd have to block it close to endpoints, because IPFS is a P2P system.
Re:How the Catalan government uses IPFS to sidestep Spain's ... by kodablah on Friday September 29, 2017 @06:09PM (#15369679)
I don't think that's tough if a country has said you need to be able to filter traffic. Assuming it is a simple pattern (e.g. whatever their NAT busting bootstrap is), set of ports, etc they could easily push filter rules to their downstream network devices if the law makes them.