Your fundamental misunderstanding of my viewpoint is that there can only ever be one of me. The "copy", as you put it, is also one of me. The two are different people by the time you come to threaten one of them with death, but at the instant of creation of the second, they were the same. They diverged since (just as identical twins would, immediately after their brains began to form in the womb). The question of "which one is me" is meaningless: they are both me, in the sense that they have a common "ancestor" (i.e in the sense that I am who I was five minutes ago), and they are both not me (in the sense that I am not who I was five minutes ago).
That'd be kind of messed up.
> A copy of you is not you; one need only not destroy the original for you to quickly admit that the copy is not you.
We're not allowed to play semantics, so this statement is meaningless: you need to play semantics if you want to use the word "is" in this context.
> If I copy you, and ask you if the copy over there is you, you'll say no.
Correct. This is using the word "is" in the same sense as I would if I said that I am no longer who I was five years ago.
> If I then kill you, you have just been sentenced to death. To be precise, someone has just been sentenced to death who was once the Smaug123-who-is-typing-this-now. The one who was killed would say "I have been sentenced to death". The one who was not killed would say "someone else has been sentenced to death".
> The copy will live on feeling as if it is you, but it isn't you, it's a copy of you.
Now who's playing semantic games ;) this time, you're using the word "you" in a different sense to me. Again, "you" refers to two concepts here: the timeless "Smaug123 who is always the same person", and the individual "Smaug123 who can vary over time".
That was not remotely a semantic game and I find this statement so absurdly intellectually dishonest that I'm done with this conversation.
Ultimately our desire for self-preservation itself only comes from our evolutionary history. That desire itself is mutable, and you could expect that the portion of it that cares about being the original would slowly evolve away if transporter use were a significant component of the fitness function.
There isn't frequently a situation in reality where a reduction in self preservation would be favored, even in the case of twins. Although I'd bet you would in fact find that twins express a moderately greater willingness to die for one another than other types of siblings.
By the way, the reason I downvoted your comment was because of the "you're projecting", which comes across as snarky and is not remotely implied by the parent comment.
EDIT: actually, I think you may have provided weak evidence against your assertion. It's not wildly unusual for a family member to sacrifice themself to save other family members from death.
A copy of you is not you, one need only not destroy the original for you to quickly admit that the copy is not you. If I copy you, and ask you if the copy over there is you, you'll say no. If I then kill you, you have just been sentenced to death. The copy will live on feeling as if it is you, but it isn't you, it's a copy of you. That is unless you believe there can be any number of you; but the second they're created they are by definition no longer you, they are them, and your experiences are no longer identical, you are instantly separate beings so they are instantly no longer you.