Copied from another sub-thread I posted in...
When Sonny Vleisides plead guilty to Felony Mail Fraud in 2007, he was forbidden to engage in loan programs, gambling or gaming activities, telemarketing activities, investment programs or any other business involving the solicitation of funds.
He went on to co-found the company called Butterfly Labs in 2010, a company that took pre-orders for Bitcoin mining equipment (in many cases soliciting funds for hardware that didn't exist, until it did).
Many people argued that this business model was a direct violation of the terms of his supervised release. He stood in front of a judge in 2014 that said there was a "strong smell" of fraud with respect to his company.
Equifax it seems gets to skip the whole "plead guilty" thing and just announced their negligent failure directly to the world.
When does Equifax get their 14 months in jail followed by a supervised release? Never, apparently, they just go on about their business and no charges are filed. I would expect for them to get a "time-out" after their bungling of the response to this breach, at the bare minimum.
But no, let's give them a participation trophy instead, let them continue handling the response to the breach, they've earned it...
You're presuming that Equifax is guilty of something. Of what? Of being victims of a hack? What about the SEC, who just notified the public now that they were hacked back in 2016?
You seem to think that Equifax is guilty of negligence. Good luck proving that. They're subject to security audits not only from the government, but in relation to the contracts they have with their various customers (standard stuff when companies deal with each other, not least of which when consumer data is involved). Their security wasn't good enough, but they didn't know that until too late. Same as Target. Same as Home Depot. Same as the SEC.
Equifax is going to get fined. They're going to lose business. They're going to eat the cost of providing identity theft protection/monitoring to the entire country. They're going to have to fight their way back to whatever previous stature they had. But any thought that they're going to be found criminally liable for this is simply not credible.
They should not have been in charge of the response, but there was no way for us to know that for sure until they had already flubbed it so badly.
They are guilty of handling the response very poorly in a way that has been hashed out and rehashed at least six dozen times on HN until the culmination (so far) yesterday, when we found out that their site was so easy to spoof it fooled even Tim, the Twitter guy from Equifax, who tweeted links to the spoof site out to eight or nine customers over the course of the response.
That was possible because of their initial poor (evidently hasty, and negligently so) response. I'm not asking to make anyone criminally liable, I'm suggesting that next time a company leaks sensitive records on 140MM Americans, we should remember this chain of events and somehow all do better. (And not have another repeat of this shit show, if possible... but who am I kidding, it will repeat.)
The poor response was probably made worse because of their internal culture that resulted in the CIO and CISO being canned (that sounds like all of their top technical leadership put out the door) right as the response was just getting underway. That too, in my opinion, was probably negligence!
I know we don't put companies in "time out" but it seems like we had better think about doing exactly that in this case, lest we soon find out what it will look like when the (next) other shoe drops.
The Equifax story will only continue to get worse! Just wait until their new free credit monitoring systems are breached, and we get to find out exactly what that mandatory class-action arbitration clause we've all heard about is actually intended to do!
Then who should have?
> we should remember this chain of events and somehow all do better. (And not have another repeat of this shit show, if possible... but who am I kidding, it will repeat.)
100% agreement here.
> Then who should have?
Better question: what would be an appropriate response? Because this one isn't, that much is sure, but I don't have an answer for this question other than "one that is not so hastily and shoddily implemented."
Further, do you really think this was a hasty response? This is the response dictated by the law, coupled with recommendations from their legal team, and probably with input from regulators as well.
It was hasty, in terms of... just look at equifaxsecurity2017.com
Did they run this plan by even one security researcher before it was put into action? If so, that person's advice was either terrible, or ignored. No time at all had elapsed between the time we were alerted to the breach, and when Equifax revealed the 2-day old site that was protected by Amazon certificate.
I am building an HR web portal for employees to submit their identity when they do not go through our background checking service (some classes of employee who are exempt from the requirement to get a background check, for archaic reasons), and I am holding up Equifax's response to the breach as an example of "What Not To Do."
There is no legal requirement for them to put up a website that looks like a phishing scam, and respond to people who put in their information with a random value of "Yes you were affected/Check back later to find out if you were affected". There would certainly have been questions about "who was affected" but it would be better to answer with a blanket response of "everyone with a credit file" than to do as they did, and say "143 million Americans, now fill out this pointless form attached to a random number generator to find out if you are one of them."
Seriously, what were they thinking? Even the most charitable light isn't enough for this to make sense.
Butterymales! What about Hillary!
My credit history is still in the hands of Equifax and I have no control over that fact. That is problem number one for me. I want to get off of Mr Bones Wild Ride.
Your credit history is in the hands of all the CRAs, just like it has been since the first time you entered into any sort of credit agreement, or opened a bank account, or applied for a car loan, or rented an apartment, got student loans, or did anything where your "credit worthiness" comes into play.
Probably because they still weren't sure that their existing systems were secure. So instead of securing them, or unplugging them, they ... built a new system, both hastily and shoddily!
Then they sent out an e-mail to everyone, telling them to put a little bit more of their SSNs than we're all used to providing at the drop of a hat, ... put them into the bucket. Isn't that about the size of it?
Not much to say about that one, for sure. I still don't understand why they wanted to make a completely separate site with that stupid name.
> Meanwhile they had delayed long past the timeline outlined in legal requirements for their reporting of the breach.
I think you'll find that they adhered to the letter of the law on that. Maybe you know when Equifax made the breach public, but you don't know when they first contacted the relevant authorities (law enforcement or regulatory).
> Where are the Congressional interviews with their executive directorship?
Oh, that's coming, for sure. Other companies have been called before congress for far less. But what good has ever come out of such a hearing? That's what you do when you want to save face with the American public and seem like you're going to do something. There might be hope...Al Franken is the ranking member on what I think is the relevant committee, and he usually does a good job in calling out BS when he sees it.
> I'm just as incensed about the response of law enforcement
How so? What would you expect from law enforcement here?