Re:Distrustful U.S. allies force spy agency to back down in ...
by treebeard901 on Thursday September 21, 2017 @04:46PM
(#15307198)
For most people the reaction to something proposed by a spy agency is to immediately assume there is an ulterior motive. Your rational explanation helps control this thought process and is much appreciated.
Re:Distrustful U.S. allies force spy agency to back down in ...
by linkregister on Thursday September 21, 2017 @11:59PM
(#15309298)
> I have been very unimpressed with the quality of NSA "TAO's" tooling, and, when I have conversations with people closer to NSA offensive cyber stuff than I am, what shakes out generally is that they people at the tip of that particular spear tend to be super young people in basically their first ever software job.
Are you trying to find out who the TAO employees on HN are? They'll be itching to defend themselves.
Re:Distrustful U.S. allies force spy agency to back down in ...
by tr1ck5t3r on Thursday September 21, 2017 @02:37PM
(#15306239)
Just add random data so every encrypted has to be brute forced and then you'll see the NSA applying for more Bluffingdales, a bigger budget, and more side channel attacks, like the Intel ME.
* I have been very unimpressed with the quality of NSA "TAO's" tooling, and, when I have conversations with people closer to NSA offensive cyber stuff than I am, what shakes out generally is that they people at the tip of that particular spear tend to be super young people in basically their first ever software job.
* But Stuxnet was sort of impressive.
* But then, what was impressive about Stuxnet was domain knowledge about a particular piece of industrial equipment, not hardcore computer science. The software engineering details of Stuxnet were kind of unimpressive.
* But there's Flame, which is impressive in a CS kind of way.
* NSA's original advantage in these kinds of systems probably stems largely from the fact that they were a monopsony buyer of cryptographic talent for many decades. You'd expect there to be a period of catching up.
* But cryptography is now one of the better known pipelines for applied mathematics research, particularly for people who cross over between math and CS, and there's a lot of those people, so it's hard to see why NSA's advantage would be sustainable over the long term.
* But also NSA does have a sustainable advantage in the kinds of cryptanalytic work that can only be done with massive, specialized compute resources, and for all I know when you can casually conduct research on gigantic ASIC clusters as easily as I can fire up Sage and add generate a curve point, you learn a whole bunch of stuff that is broadly applicable.
* But academics get to collaborate directly with everyone in their field and NSA not so much, which is a mitigating factor.
I think it's very healthy that we assume that NSA has space-alien capabilities. It adds rigor to our security models. And again I don't think we should use things like SIMON and SPECK.
I just don't think we have to stop talking about the engineering aspects of SIMON and SPECK simply because they came from the NSA.