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Re:A decade after the crisis, The Fed plans to shrink its bo... by wahern on Tuesday September 19, 2017 @12:09AM (#15281702)
The Federal Reserve != the U.S. Treasury

The U.S. Treasury turned a profit on TARP. TARP debits and credits work just like any other government expenditure.

A lot of pundits lump TARP with the Federal Reserve's quantitative easing (QE) program. QE was a program where the Federal Reserve itself purchased assets (mortgage securities, bonds, etc). The assets to purchase these were much more akin to printing money, I suppose. And this program was much larger than TARP in dollar value. This asset purchase program has turned a profit for the government because dividends, resales, etc, have exceeded the outlays. The Federal Reserve must, by statute, transfer such profits to the Treasury.

I say "I suppose" because _anybody_ can print money. For example, I can give you an IOU in exchange for gold bars. You can then put that IOU on your books as an asset, which in turn allows you to borrow against it, perhaps getting even more gold bars of your own if you can convince others the IOU was worth more than you paid. We got into this mess because the investment banks were, conceptually, printing money by assembling mortgages into securities and then reselling or borrowing against the securities for a price (in retrospect) far greater than the long-term return of the underlying assets. Derivatives markets then multiplied the differential many fold. In all these cases nobody actually prints currency notes; nonetheless, the total dollar value of assets on the books has increased.

I don't think it's very useful to equivocate all these financial machinations. Papering over them is precisely how we got into this mess.[1] And while I guess it's fair to say that the Federal Reserve can print money, the implications of that are neither clear nor inevitable. The Federal Reserve has a legal mandate to keep inflation rates low. Often people are trying to allude to the specter of hyperinflation. But it's worth remembering that the hyperinflation in Weimar Germany was very much _intentional_. The Germans pursued hyperinflation to spite the WWI allies, as it allowed them for a time to minimize the effect of war reparations on their domestic economy (if they printed money fast enough, they could purchase foreign currency before the official exchange rates reacted[2]). Eventually it became something that they were, politically, unable to roll back. Hyperinflation in Zimbabwe was a self-fulfilling prophecy, and a symptom of a failed state, similar to the tail end of the Weimar Republic.

Note that in both cases these events were fundamentally driven by politics. If the Federal Reserve ever got itself into a situation where it couldn't stop pumping assets into the system, it's almost certain that it would have been preceded by Congress first changing the laws. Currently the Federal Reserve is substantially (though not completely) independent from political forces. In any event, if the Federal Reserve ended up in that sort of situation it would undoubtedly be symptomatic of much larger problems in the country.

[1] Thinking they're unnecessary and could be done away with is naive. The book-value of assets will always involve guess work because it requires people to quantify the likelihood of future events based on imperfect information about the present. And there will always be mechanisms that compound errors in this guess work. The way you control systemic risk is through diversity and uncoupling.

[2] Ironically, the gold standard made this arbitrage both feasible--it took longer for individual exchange rates to react--and was a central cause--the gold standard caused severe deflation across Europe. Deflation sucks for debtors, and war reparations made Weimar Germany the biggest debtor of them all.

Why severe deflation across Europe? It coincided with the apex of the industrial revolution in the U.S. The U.S. was pumping out radios and refrigerators like crazy, and Europeans were buying them up like hot cakes. Because everybody was on the gold standard, and because every central banker refused to readjust their exchange rate with gold, increasing amounts of gold in all the central banks in Europe were credited to the U.S. account balance. That meant less gold per unit of national currency, which meant deflation. The way inflation in the U.S. occurred is that Europeans began purchasing U.S. securities, because each unit of domestic currency purchased increasing amount of American dollars. Likewise, repatriated profits were dumped into the stock market. This is how the gold standard directly precipitated the stock market crash of 1929.

Something similar is happening between China and the U.S., except that the U.S. dollar is a floating currency and China is attempting to avoid domestic inflation by preventing the repatriation of assets (that is, China effectively forces producers to invest their profits in U.S. securities). The end result is that deflation is blunted in the U.S., but it's a huge reason why despite QE we haven't seen much inflation.

Re:A decade after the crisis, The Fed plans to shrink its bo... by pjmorris on Tuesday September 19, 2017 @04:26AM (#15282715)
Thank you for the informative post.

You write:

> The end result is that deflation is blunted in the U.S., but it's a huge reason why despite QE we haven't seen much inflation.

My view has been that a pretty solid chunk of inflation has already happened, in the housing market, as measured by the change in house prices since ~Y2K, and by the expansion of the Fed's balance sheet by ~2T in MBS purchases. QE acted as a way to pay off the jumbo loans made to retail workers, house flippers, etc that were too large a burden for them to pay. What do you think of my theory?

Re:A decade after the crisis, The Fed plans to shrink its bo... by eli_gottlieb on Tuesday September 19, 2017 @08:40PM (#15289901)
>My view has been that a pretty solid chunk of inflation has already happened, in the housing market, as measured by the change in house prices since ~Y2K, and by the expansion of the Fed's balance sheet by ~2T in MBS purchases.

Asset inflation is a rather distinct thing from across-the-board inflation, which would have to include wages.

Re:A decade after the crisis, The Fed plans to shrink its bo... by pjmorris on Wednesday September 20, 2017 @08:31AM (#15292966)
Deciding whether to buy T-Bills or invest in a hedge fund is an investment decision that a relative few make. Deciding whether to have a roof over your head or not is much more than an investment decision. I reason that asset inflation in house prices is a form of wage deflation. Asset and wage inflation may be distinct theoretical categories, but they affect each other in practice.
Re:A decade after the crisis, The Fed plans to shrink its bo... by eli_gottlieb on Wednesday September 20, 2017 @10:15AM (#15293939)
That's some very insightful reasoning. Thanks for presenting it that way!
Re:A decade after the crisis, The Fed plans to shrink its bo... by RobertoG on Tuesday September 19, 2017 @04:07AM (#15282640)
"Hyperinflation in Zimbabwe was a self-fulfilling prophecy, and a symptom of a failed state, similar to the tail end of the Weimar Republic."

Actually, it seems that Zimbabwe was a case of supply shock, not of "printing" too much:

'[..]A rapid demand contraction was required but impossible to implement politically given that 45 per cent of the food output capacity was destroyed.'

http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=3773

You wrote an interesting post, by the way.

Re:A decade after the crisis, The Fed plans to shrink its bo... by uiri on Tuesday September 19, 2017 @12:50AM (#15281884)
One thing I don't understand about how debt is supposed to "print" money is that each asset dollar is cancelled out by a liability dollar (the debt in question). So if you borrow $(X+k) against an asset worth $X, then you're underwater by $k.

Nonetheless, thank you for the interesting and informative post.

Re:A decade after the crisis, The Fed plans to shrink its bo... by wahern on Tuesday September 19, 2017 @02:12AM (#15282174)
If I borrow $5 then I'm immediately in the red. But presumably I'm borrowing that $5 so I can turn a profit of $6 tomorrow. I then pay my $5 off and borrow $6 more. Now I'm $1 richer but still in the red. Rinse & repeat. When the day comes that you can't repeat and you need to unwind, if the resale value of your assets is less than your liabilities, then you go bankrupt. This is literally how the 2008 crisis unfolded, except in a domino fashion. Not because the entire system as a whole couldn't have absorbed the losses (again, both TARP and the Federal Reserve ultimately made a profit, even early on), but because 1) the web of the financing directly or indirectly exposed to mortgage-backed securities reached so far, and 2) unwinding is never instantaneous (it cascades), short-term lending seized up. For various technical reason most large businesses (especially but not exclusively investment banks) rely on short-term lending for liquidity. When the system seized everybody had to begin to unwind at precisely the moment when the immediate resale value of their assets (especially mortgages, and light of the disruption of lending normally used to purchase such assets) was exceptionally low--lower then the (in retrospect) long-term return.

On some level it's all as simple as we intuitively think it is. I think the difficulty is coming to the realization that it's turtles all the way down--there's no magical, true price where book-value perfectly reflects all "real" assets. This dynamic complexity is most apparent when you dig into currency exchange rates, where you very often get very counter-intuitive results when you [literally and figuratively] follow the money. I'm by no means an expert, either in finance, accounting, or math. But I did study international economics in undergraduate, which has helped me to internalize the notion that there's no "true" price to anything except for what others are willing to exchange at any one moment, given all their imperfect information and incentives. And in graduate school I took an economics course with a professor who wrote one of the first studies (commissioned by Toyota) that empirically showed how exchange rates fluctuated in response to current account surpluses and deficits, in turn effecting demand & supply--a phenomenon everybody now takes for granted but which was not widely appreciated at the time even though it's obvious in retrospect. He really only mentioned it in passing one day, but the concept really stuck in my head and has helped me to conceptualize (albeit very imperfectly and at a high level) that valuation is an ongoing process; quantifying it at a fixed point in time is less meaningful than we intuitively believe.

But don't take my word for any of this. One of the most enlightening books I've ever read is "Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World", which won the 2010 Pulitzer Prize. I read it in 2010, shortly before I read The Big Short, because of the accolades and because I wanted some context to the economic crisis. It's partly a scholarly work which makes it little dry, but its still very accessible. Basically, everything I said above about the role of the gold standard in the interwar period (WWI to WWII) comes directly from that book. Reading the Big Short explains how the mortgage-backed securities market works. It helps to have some grounding in economics to really maximize your dividends from reading those books.

Re:A decade after the crisis, The Fed plans to shrink its bo... by danmaz74 on Tuesday September 19, 2017 @06:04AM (#15283175)
Thanks from me too, very interesting. I'm also no professional expert, but it looks to me like this can be non-intuitive because borrowing "creates money" only when said borrowing is linked to an asset bubble.

Case in point: if my house appreciates on the market by $100K, I am $100K "richer"; this by itself doesn't increase the circulating money. But if I'm able to borrow $100K by mortgaging the increased value of my house, now I have $100K more to spend. The lender has $100K less in their bank account, but they now have a mortgage-backed security which is worth $100K and that, if there is a liquid market for such securities, can be almost as good as actual dollars for trading. The circulating money has increased.

It gets even worse. If the lender and/or the borrower use even just a part of those $100K to speculate in the housing market, the bubble will accelerate... until, at some point, enough people actually want to use their new riches to buy products that aren't part of the asset bubble, and producers of those products don't accept those inflated securities as payment. Then, the bubble bursts.

And, by the way, this whole mechanism has nothing to do with bad central banks or fiat money. It's perfectly consistent with a perfect free market AFAIK, and the only (not easy at all) way to prevent it is regulation.

Re:A decade after the crisis, The Fed plans to shrink its bo... by AnimalMuppet on Tuesday September 19, 2017 @02:53PM (#15287695)
Well, the central bank is supposed to watch out for this kind of stuff, and adjust to prevent it. The problem is that several other actors also have levers they can adjust, and they act after the central bank does. This means that the central bank has a very imprecise kind of control.
Re:A decade after the crisis, The Fed plans to shrink its bo... by saiya-jin on Tuesday September 19, 2017 @03:59AM (#15282603)
Thank you sir for explanation that is understandable even to financial layman like me. Posts like these make me read much more comments section on HN compared to actual articles :)
Re:A decade after the crisis, The Fed plans to shrink its bo... by autokad on Tuesday September 19, 2017 @11:15AM (#15285350)
finally someone that knows the difference between tarp and QE.

I don't know if QE3 was entirely apolitical. it felt unnecessary in its scale and made sure the markets were well juiced before the 2012 election.

it will be interesting to see where this takes us. i dont think an economy has been in this situation before. hopefully some natural growth can take over because it feels like we are in The Bubble. The bubble of bubbles. The only thing is, there is so much money in the market it has no where to go.

Re:A decade after the crisis, The Fed plans to shrink its bo... by AnimalMuppet on Tuesday September 19, 2017 @02:51PM (#15287671)
> That meant less gold per unit of national currency, which meant deflation.

That seems backwards to me. Wouldn't less gold per unit of national currency mean inflation? Each unit of currency equating to less gold means that it's worth less. In deflation, it would be worth more.

Re:A decade after the crisis, The Fed plans to shrink its bo... by linkregister on Tuesday September 19, 2017 @12:29AM (#15281786)
Thank you for a comprehensive answer to my question and your correction to my massive conflation of the TARP assets and QE.

Is it fair to say that you disagree with the original poster's pessimism (that appears to be quite popular at the moment with the HN crowd)?

Re:A decade after the crisis, The Fed plans to shrink its bo... by wahern on Tuesday September 19, 2017 @04:05AM (#15282631)
Well, I disagree in the sense that the conclusion--a bubble--doesn't follow from the characterizations--Federal Reserve QE, ability to print money, etc. And the characterizations used seem to echo a particular narrative that elides almost all detail, deriving its conclusions almost entirely from political philosophy. Even if the political philosophy is correct, it's so divorced from the here-and-now that it has zero value--like how fundamental physics predicts the inevitable heat death of the universe but tells you little if anything about the precise arrangement of matter tomorrow.

When QE first started, conservative analysts were swearing up-and-down that we'd shortly see inflation. That has yet to happen. A couple of years ago some more mainstream analysts (as well as the market) were predicting 20-30 years of extremely low inflation. But today the mainstream is much more unsure about long-term rates. Neither group seems right or wrong to me; more that they underestimated uncertainty, rather than misjudged risk. Unfortunately, that doesn't stop them from qualifying their assessments after the fact and claiming that _now_ they're more certain, just with larger error bars.

Even if we presume that we are in a bubble and that this bubble was created by QE[1], that still doesn't tell you much of anything. If it did there'd be many more rich investors than there apparently are; and their absence isn't necessarily just a reflection of their inability to time things precisely. The _determinative_ factors going forwards aren't necessarily the big, obvious factors in the prelude.

But I'm neither pessimistic nor optimistic. I'm personally more interested in how the clock works, not what time it is.

[1] QE added $2 trillion into the system. That seems like a lot until you realize that the U.S. stock market is $25 trillion and the U.S. bond market is $35 trillion. And trade in U.S. assets is part of a global market, which is greater than $100 trillion in stocks and bonds alone. Many other commenters on HN are much more knowledgable than me, but in light of those numbers I don't see anything obvious or inevitable about the ultimate effect of the Federal Reserve's QE program. I can understand, superficially, how QE _could_ theoretically effect the system. Even at a substantially lesser amount other factors could compound the intervention. On the other hand, theoretically QE could have had almost no effect whatsoever (other than the timing preventing a collapse), simply displacing $2 trillion of foreign investments that would have resulted in the same asset prices we have today.

EDIT: The most recent information I found Googling shows close to $200 trillion in stocks and bonds in 2014 (<$60 trillion public debt), and almost $300 trillion in global financial assets (stocks, bonds, and other loans). See http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:4MeIUgO...

Re:A decade after the crisis, The Fed plans to shrink its bo... by roymurdock on Tuesday September 19, 2017 @11:46AM (#15285659)
Some of the first studies on QE's economic effects are starting to come out -

"Using confidential loan officer survey data on lending standards and internal risk ratings on loans, we document an effect of large-scale asset purchase programs (LSAPs) on lending standards and risk-taking. We exploit cross-sectional variation in banks’ holdings of mortgage-backed securities to show that the first and third round of quantitative easing (QE1 and QE3) significantly lowered lending standards and increased loan risk characteristics. The magnitude of the effects is about the same in QE1 and QE3, and is comparable to the effect of a one percentage point decrease in the Fed funds target rate."

https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2017093pap...

Re:A decade after the crisis, The Fed plans to shrink its bo... by tmp998876 on Tuesday September 19, 2017 @06:08AM (#15283195)
You say "...less gold per unit of national currency, which meant deflation" I think that would mean inflation not deflation. Why do you say that?
Re:A decade after the crisis, The Fed plans to shrink its bo... by zeckalpha on Tuesday September 19, 2017 @08:43AM (#15284105)
"everybody was on the gold standard"
Re:A decade after the crisis, The Fed plans to shrink its bo... by 35bge57dtjku on Tuesday September 19, 2017 @01:58AM (#15282127)
Wow, I wish all of my college professors were that interesting all the time.