If your claim is that your philosophical position can not be verified, then sure, nothing verifies it. Typically, however, philosophers actually claim their ideas are in tight correlation with reality. That offers plenty of opportunities for verification.

Such as...

> there is nothing that verifies mistakes so you can succeeded without being absolutely correct

Yes there is. The primary method of argument is proof.

At a practical level acceptance in The Philosophical Review arguably the top Journal does not require some sort of mechanical formal verification.

The barriers to entry are no less difficult from it's absence, but the barriers to accuracy are defiantly lower.

Does any journal exist which includes mechanical formal verification as part of its acceptance process? Not even mathematical journals do this. Hell, mathematicians would probably lose their minds if such a thing was suggested. Just look at the crisis the Four Color Theorem proof caused when it came out.

> Yes there is. The primary method of argument is proof.

Only in logic, I think. Is there proof in ethics? (which is not to say that I think it is an invalid field of discourse.) One can demand internal consistency in a philosophical argument, but not necessarily proof.

In the interminable squabbles over consciousness and the mind, the physicalists and the dualists each seem to think they have ruled out their opponents' position, but they can't both be right.

And yet, proof in this domain isn't precise the way a mathematical proof is precise.

Of course it's precise (in fact, it's isomorphic to a mathematical proof).

If you read universally accepted classical philosophers most of their work are not precise at all, yet they are widely recognized.

Actually, a lot of philosophy is "arguable". I don't think you can argue a lot with a mathematical proof.

And I'm sorry, but when Lacan compare the penis to square root of -1, it's hard to come back to scientists and sell the rigor of philosophy. Same when philosophers use and abuse Gödel's incompleteness theorems or the quantum observer effect to justify ludicrous claims.

> Same when philosophers use and abuse Gödel's incompleteness theorems...

Except the most popular abuser of Gödel's conclusions by far is a physicist and mathematician.

Nobody said scientists couldn't be wrong. I'm just against the idea that philosophy is as rigorous as maths in most of the forms it has taken until today.

I suppose it depends on how narrowly you are defining philosophy. But the fact is that we can write computer programs to verify many more kinds of mathematical proofs than we can philosophical "proofs".

Even mathematical proof is a relatively low standard in practice.

Just look at all the retracted papers that have been published. Erratum are surprisingly widespread for such a formal system.

Making a mistake has nothing to do with using an accurate system. You can have the most precise ruler in the world and yet use it incorrectly.

My point is that perfection is not required. So, calling something a proof does not mean it must be accurate.

Of course it is. When you see a mistake in a reasoning, it's not called a proof anymore. It's kinda the definition.

The problem is it was called a proof beforehand.

So, their is cases of demonstrated lag between publishing and problems showing up. Therefore in the strictest possible terms, every published result is in some way suspects as they simply have yet to be disproved.

I am in no way suggesting this is some kind of reasonable standard. Just that math is slightly more subjective than often portrayed.

PS: This line of reasoning was simply in response to the suggesting that proof somehow inherently implied accuracy.

Fair enough :)