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Re:HTTP Immutable Responses by AgentME on Friday September 15, 2017 @08:00PM (#15261844)
The issue is that an attacker could buy a domain, serve content from it with the cache-control: immutable response, and then later someone else buys the domain, puts their own content on it, but a lot of their users (who had accessed the domain when it was owned by the attacker) have a lot of the attacker's immutable content permanently cached.

Even if the second owner follows the advice of setting expiration dates appropriately, nothing helps them.

Re:HTTP Immutable Responses by taeric on Friday September 15, 2017 @09:30PM (#15262259)
That ignores attacks on dns and certificate authorities.

I could readily see a fun novel about a nation state or isp using this trick to seed malicious code to a lot of public sites. Imagine setting it for index.html on any site with a source that merely bootstraps to the intended site. Along with the malicious code.

Re:HTTP Immutable Responses by mseebach on Saturday September 16, 2017 @06:02AM (#15263878)
In an attack where DNS and CAs are compromised, immutable caching is going to be be least of our problems, frankly.
Re:HTTP Immutable Responses by taeric on Saturday September 16, 2017 @11:27AM (#15265037)
Hasn't this happened? Several times?

I'm not trying to say it is everyday. But it is easier than you think.

Browsers are removing bad authorities. Which is good. There are a lot of them, though. Which is a larger attack surface than many folks acknowledge.