And yet in every typo squatting case, there's multiple projects leading back to a single contributor. It's almost like noticing a little known nobody sneaking to the front of the Pareto distribution would be a huge red flag.

By "every typo squatting case" do you just mean researchers demonstrating the viability of the attack against various systems? A system that successfully defends against researchers but not against actual genuine attackers would be worse than useless. If I actually wanted to pull off an attack without anyone noticing for as long as possible, I'd just target a single package whose maintainer is on vacation.

I think the only way your key-signing mechanism would actually solve the problem is if we made it actively hard for new developers to upload projects to PyPI without a long vetting process. Some projects work this way (Debian, notably; I've had upload rights for a few Debian packages for years and still don't feel ready to apply for full access), but I think it's a poor match for PyPI's actual goal.

Your arguments and exaggerated claims are silly. I can point to Maven Central all day long. They're doing it right. They don't have these problems.

You know who does this sort of thing? Politicians. They can't just look at a working system, single payer for instance, and copy it. No, they have to make silly arguments about why it will never work, despite a concrete, working example, right in front of their own eyes.

Donald already pointed out that the key difference in Maven Central is a manual review process, not package signing.

If Python introduced manual review of new packages, it would either need a massive amount of resources that no-one is offering to provide, or it would immediately be a huge bottleneck on people making new packages, which the community doesn't want to do.

>the key difference in Maven Central is a manual review process

Lipstick on the pig, still covered in mud.

The key difference is the regular occurrence of malware finding its way into PyPi and NPM due to the lack of multilayered security on those repos.

You guys keep trying to prop up the straw man that ONLY package signing is needed. It's not. It's a start. Nobody is making that argument but you. You not only repeatedly beat that dead horse, but you carry it to the illogical extreme that package signing is somehow harmful. Not only do you see no value in that layer of security, but you actively resist any talk or attempts at implementing it.

Meanwhile, your repo is infested with hackers and malware. Big surprise.

Hyperbole and insults. Now you're just trolling. If I see a cockroach in the kitchen, I kill it and spray. I don't rip out the walls or move house.

That sounds like you're relying on blacklisting the 'bad guy' key that's uploading all the malicious packages. Any half-way competent bad guy will generate a new key for each package (or try to steal keys with some good reputation), so it won't work.