The question is whether human subjectivity actually is true first person, irreducible subjectivity, or just an illusion of it.
Consider the analogy to sight: seeing is believing right? And yet, at some point you'll see an optical illusion whose logical properties are simply inconsistent with other properties you've seen. Like how water appears to break pencils [1]. So how do you reconcile this? Clearly seeing can't always entail believing.
Enter science. As I linked elsewhere in this thread, science can explain fake subjectivity quite well. So your choice would seem to be throwing away our best tool for objective knowledge just to preserve some special property of human minds that ultimately makes no real difference.
When you're having a dream, it is all an illusion (of the first kind), but to conclude that you are therefore not experiencing anything whatsoever and thus there's nothing to explain would be a grave mistake. You're not blacked out, and no amount of reasoning would make it so.
The same holds here, no matter how much more consistent this reality appears to be.
I think it does. Unless you seriously think you dream before you've ever had a single experience? Dreams are memory mashups.
> When you're having a dream, it is all an illusion (of the first kind), but to conclude that you are therefore not experiencing anything whatsoever and thus there's nothing to explain would be a grave mistake.
I've already acknowledged that humans "experience" things, in a colloquial sense.
What's left to explain is whether it's possible to capture what we term "experience" using third-person objective facts. We still need an account of how this happens, so there's plenty left to explain.
Thanks for the clarification. Perhaps we don't disagree in the way I thought. Let me see if I understand our divergence.
Because my experiences have a certain consistency, I infer an objective cause. Because this continues to happen, I become increasingly certain about this model (e.g., materialism). In brief, the way I model reality is the result of a particular configuration of experiences. I then use this model to explain the existence of experience itself. So far I hope we're on the same page.
Where I think the divergence happens is in whether a person considers the inferred model (materialism) or the "sheer phenomenon" (colloquially, "experience") to be more fundamental. I think I understand (and respect) why you and others feel it should be the former. Being the sort of person who spends time relaxing my inferences about reality (i.e., "meditating"), I feel it's the latter.
Anyway, I should probably go spend time doing something else. Apologies if I've mischaracterized your views.
> When you're having a dream, it is all an illusion (of the first kind)
How would you characterize a dream in which friends or family members are present? Are these not "facts about an external reality"? Presumably, you aren't dreaming about my family members, as you have never met them.
Yet here I am, dreaming about them for some reason. I would argue this is due to the "external reality" where my family members exist and I have interacted with them.
From these sorts of examples, we can conclude that whatever we think we are experiencing might not be what we are actually experiencing -- but crucially, not that we are therefore not experiencing anything whatsoever. The visual experience of a broken pencil doesn't stop happening just because you know it's not really a broken pencil. It keeps happening but means something else.
If you are dead honest with yourself, and drop all your metaphysics for a moment, you will discover that various things certainly seem to be happening (sights, sounds, thoughts, etc.). Try it right now! This "sheer fact" deserves an explanation, and though logical and metaphysical games can produce the explanation "there's nothing there to explain," many people don't consider that any kind of explanation. (Furthermore, I hypothesize that for those that do consider it a valid explanation, spending more time in that "dead honest" state, where there's minimal conceptualization of one's experience, will slowly eat away at their confidence in the usefulness of the "explanation." Conversely, thinking harder and harder about it may indeed bolster it.)
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15245740
I'm curious what you think of it.
>> The trouble I have is that "modeling" can happen in the absence of what I'm calling "experience."
> This is the big claim. I'm highly skeptical.
Sure, it depends on what the word "modeling" means. The way I've always used it, it applies to lots of existing systems, including robots. Are they conscious? Maybe. I don't know. It seems easy to build a very simple system that trivially "models" itself. Does that mean it's conscious?
> As another angle, this seems closely related to identity.
As it happens, (lack of) identity is a critical realization on the Buddhist path (among others). If we look carefully enough, we can't find one. Instead, we find something like this. Take a perception like sound. Instead of discovering a self that hears it, it's more like the sound itself is made of the sheer fact of subjectivity; i.e., "made of" consciousness. There is no "I" that is conscious (though of course the concept still remains useful). Instead, consciousness is that property which [everything I could possibly call or think of as] the world is "made of."
> Meditation is very interesting. I've done some, and I'd like to dig into it more. However, I interpret the experience differently.
That's fair. There are different ways and degrees of doing it.
Ultimately, I think the distinction comes down to whether we treat "consciousness" as an abstract, objective property (that I assume others have), or this "sheer fact of subjectivity" that seems impossible to communicate (that I can know I have). One of these I'm happy to reduce to other objective properties, and the other I am not.
No, it would not be. I think everyone agrees what humans can do is fairly distinct (and many animals, to a much lesser degree). If it wasn't clear, I'm arguing it can be understood as an incredibly sophisticated form of modeling. A toy system can have a model of itself, but it will be a very weak and limited model with essentially no broader context. The models that the human brain constructs are immensely richer, with many orders of magnitude more complexity. I would argue that significant awareness requires this depth and richness.
> Take a perception like sound. Instead of discovering a self that hears it, it's more like the sound itself is made of the sheer fact of subjectivity; i.e., "made of" consciousness.
We are now getting into territory that feels more difficult to address. I don't know how to meaningfully interpret this claim that sound itself is made of consciousness. Do you mean to say that the phenomenon going on in the human brain is the actually same thing that is occurring in a wave of air molecules? I'd be curious to see what evidence you believe there is for this idea, beyond your personal meditation sessions.
Almost all of my daily life involves some sort of modeling and planning, which I think is why so many models of consciousness take that as a starting point. But I think it's important to incorporate non-ordinary states if we want to capture the entirety of the concept. (I'm not saying that the brain isn't doing some sort of modeling even when I'm in non-ordinary states, including contentless ones, but it fails to capture the interesting aspects of the phenomenon under question.)
As for the "made of" stuff, let me try a different tack. Sorry, wall of text coming.
For a moment, I want you to be as profoundly skeptical as you can. For example, you cannot be certain that matter, space, etc. exist. This could all be a dream, or illusion, or simulation, etc.
But notice that there is something you can be certain of. For example, if you close your eyes and listen to a sound (ideally a continuous one), you can be certain that sound is happening. But of course, we're being skeptical, so we better reduce that to "something is happening." Or if that's not skeptical enough, "it seems like something is happening." Be as skeptical as you can, and notice that there is still "something" that you simply cannot meaningfully doubt.
(At this point, sometimes people think "oh, well maybe it's not really happening," and in a certain philosophical sense, that's useful. But no matter how much philosophizing you do, still, there that [something/nothing/whatever-you-feel-like-naming-it] is. I don't know how better to put this.)
What is it I'm certain of? It's the happening-ness of it. Put another way, my conscious experience of it. To say "it is happening" is to say "I am conscious of it." Somehow, its very "existence" is inseparable from "my consciousness of it." Two descriptions of the same "sheer subjective fact." In this sense, "sound" refers to a particular modulation of this property called "consciousness," almost as though (get ready for woo!) consciousness were an energetic property that manifests as sight, sound, smells, thoughts, emotions, memories, etc.
This property is literally the only thing I've ever encountered. I'm willing to entertain various metaphysical explanations for the patterns it makes (generally known as "physical reality") but those hypothetical constructs are forever secondary for me. I can never know if they really exist, and find myself unable to reduce a certain phenomenon to uncertain phenomena.
I realize how nonsensical this sounds. Why couldn't the whole above story be some nonsense my (real, physical) brain is concocting? I don't have a good answer.
Totally with you on this.
> What is it I'm certain of? It's the happening-ness of it. Put another way, my conscious experience of it. To say "it is happening" is to say "I am conscious of it."
Still with you. Although being skeptical, I would say we should be quite careful in how much we are implying with a phrase like "I am conscious of it".
> In this sense, "sound" refers to a particular modulation of this property called "consciousness," almost as though (get ready for woo!) consciousness were an energetic property that manifests as sight, sound, smells, thoughts, emotions, memories, etc.
Thanks for the "woo" warning :). This is definitely where you lose me! I can't find any reason to make that jump. I don't see how that conclusion follows, or what reason there is to think that is the case.
For me, it is much simpler to assume (with some fundamental caveats) that what we see is what we get, especially if we are able to test it from many different angles and with many different tools of measurement. I understand that these tools are limited, but they can still tell us a great deal. In the domains where science can't make strong statements, I willingly lean back on accumulated human wisdom (but with a skeptical eye).
At the end of the day, I try to discard as many unsupported assumptions or beliefs as I can when constructing my worldview , to the best of my ability.
> Why couldn't the whole above story be some nonsense my (real, physical) brain is concocting?
This is a very good question. Cheers!
Sure. I'm more or less defining what I mean by "consciousness" in that statement. It is the indisputable fact that (put colloquially) "something seems to be happening." Since we're being skeptical, there's really no phrasing that cannot be disputed, so I can only ask you to do the experiment to see what I might be pointing at. Something definitely seems to be happening, even if in some other sense we might say it is not "actually" happening.
I no longer consider it meaningful to "explain" that definite property in terms of fundamentally uncertain metaphysical concepts like time and space, no matter how likely they appear to be. I appreciate that others may differ here. Thanks for the dialogue!
The trouble I have is that "modeling" can happen in the absence of what I'm calling "experience." Given that one can happen without the other, they cannot be equivalent.
So the trouble always seems to come back to giving a formal definition for "experience." I admit that I can't, but I can give a procedure (roughly, meditation) that seems to get other people to a point where they say "oh, that."
For a particular reason that I seem unable to communicate, at that point it becomes less meaningful to say that experience is "caused by" physical things as opposed to merely correlated with them. The more clearly I see what it is I'm trying to explain, the more clear it becomes why there's an "explanatory gap."
I'm sure this is terribly unsatisfying and sounds like hand-waving woo, and I'm sorry I can't do better right now.
This is the big claim. I'm highly skeptical.
The way I see it, the self-modeling that occurs in biological organisms _is_ the conscious experience. They are one and the same. Each momentary, instantaneous experience is the latest output of the self-modeling process.
As another angle, this seems closely related to identity. I see identity as being intertwined with, perhaps even stemming from, the accumulated impact and memory of these models. At least, the portions that refer to us. The boundaries can be quite fuzzy -- we are partially defined by our friends, etc.
Each instantaneous model changes the brain a bit, and over time this process constructs one's identity (starting with a tiny kernel at birth)
In summary, maybe we can say that "I" is simply the brain's current best guess at what the entity that houses it actually is, and that conscious experience is the brain's best guess at what this "I" is currently experiencing (caveat: these guesses are biased towards survival -- accuracy is not the only concern).
> but I can give a procedure (roughly, meditation) that seems to get other people to a point where they say "oh, that."
Meditation is very interesting. I've done some, and I'd like to dig into it more. However, I interpret the experience differently.
> I'm sure this is terribly unsatisfying and sounds like hand-waving woo, and I'm sorry I can't do better right now.
Not at all! I'm enjoying the discussion. Thanks for being frank.
The point is that subjective phenomena are the most basic facts of my existence, so it's not even meaningful for me to explain (or worse, deny) them with respect to (in favor of) things I extrapolated from them.
I think last time you didn't agree that subjective phenomena were the most immediate facts of my experience. If that's still the case, perhaps I can try to be more precise.