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Re:Privacy Loss in Apple's Implementation of Differential Pr... by frankmcsherry on Tuesday September 12, 2017 @08:43AM (#15226788)
Yes, I think you've misunderstood.

The text you've quoted is about how a random subset of the population is already immune to the issue of repeated queries, not that subsampling the population helps in any way. If you don't interrupt the quotation mid-sentence, it reads:

> Even so, some randomly-chosen users need not fear such attacks at all: with probability (1/2 f)^h, clients will generate a Permanent randomized response B with all 0s at the positions of set Bloom filter bits. Since these clients are not contributing any useful information to the collection process, targeting them individually by an attacker is counter-productive.

The whole of section 6.1 is not about how it only protects a single question, it is about how one ensures that the single-question protections generalize to larger surveys, concluding that

> This issue, however, can be mostly handled with careful collection design.

Re:Privacy Loss in Apple's Implementation of Differential Pr... by cm2187 on Tuesday September 12, 2017 @09:02AM (#15226901)
Sampling and taking a random subset of the population are synonymous.

But my point is precisely that this technique helps with a single question. As soon as you are doing continuous mass collection you don't really get any privacy protection from this technique, and you have to rely on other techniques (encryption, etc).

Re:Privacy Loss in Apple's Implementation of Differential Pr... by yorwba on Tuesday September 12, 2017 @12:11PM (#15228498)
There are two kinds of sampling involved here: selecting whom to ask a question, and individuals selecting their responses. The random subset of the population is determined by their own choices, that lead them to never say anything useful. An attacker has no influence on this, so if their target is within that group, the attack can't succeed.