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Re:Quadratic voting (2014) by lordnacho on Saturday September 09, 2017 @08:16AM (#15206740)
Does anyone know whether this has any effect on Arrow's Impossibility Theorem? Or does it violate some assumption, making it a separate (but related) issue? (Of course a theorem is a theorem, so it's not going to invalidate it...)

I'd assume that this paper is written by someone who has intimate knowledge of AIT, just looking for some perspective.

Re:Quadratic voting (2014) by Ari_Rahikkala on Saturday September 09, 2017 @08:53AM (#15206840)
AIT applies to:

- Votes with at least three options. A simple majority vote between two options does in fact satisfy all of Arrow's fairness criteria (if only vacuously).

- Ranked voting systems, i.e. ones where voters only give a rank ordering of their options, not any more information.

Quadratic voting is neither of those: It applies only to binary decisions, but for those decisions, it tries to be more fair than Arrow's criteria call for, by getting out not only information about which option voters prefer, but how strongly they prefer it. Whether it could be extended to more complex votes than binary ones, I don't know.