Re:Titan in depth: Security in plaintext
by colllectorof on Friday August 25, 2017 @03:45AM
(#15096876)
If you trust the software you booted (which seems to be the main feature), why would you need a hardware module to sign your logs? I.e. what additional attack scenarios does hardware-based log signing prevent?
Re:Titan in depth: Security in plaintext
by demosthenes111 on Friday August 25, 2017 @04:17AM
(#15096970)
The best security is like an onion. Let's say something goes wrong/funky and you're concerned an outside actor may have somehow gained access to the "secure" system. Can you trust your logs?
Re:Titan in depth: Security in plaintext
by bluegate010 on Friday August 25, 2017 @12:34PM
(#15099795)
The log signing prevents undetected tampering after-the-fact; the goal is to make it readily apparent when log messages are altered or deleted, even by parties with root access.
"...Titan cryptographically associates the log messages with successive values of a secure monotonic counter maintained by Titan, and signs these associations with its private key. This binding of log messages with secure monotonic counter values ensures that audit logs cannot be altered or deleted without detection, even by insiders with root access to the relevant machine."