Studying how Firefox can collect additional data in a privacy-preserving way

Re:Studying how Firefox can collect additional data in a pri... by Sir_Substance on Tuesday August 22, 2017 @07:37PM (#15077248)

The problem with differential privacy is I have to trust the person aggregating the data to actually do it.

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Re:Studying how Firefox can collect additional data in a pri... by comex on Tuesday August 22, 2017 @08:06PM (#15077388)

This is incorrect, at least in theory. RAPPOR is designed to protect the user's data even if an attacker can see all of their individual responses over time. Of course, there could be implementation issues...

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Re:Studying how Firefox can collect additional data in a pri... by cgio on Tuesday August 22, 2017 @08:04PM (#15077379)

Do you? Excuse my ignorance, but I thought there was a way to locally mangle the data before submitting. Is that not what apple is doing?

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Re:Studying how Firefox can collect additional data in a pri... by NabenHarb on Wednesday August 23, 2017 @02:13PM (#15083751)

For the case of RAPPOR (and for what Apple is doing), you do not need to trust the aggregator with your data. These algorithms operate in the "local" model of differential privacy, where all privatization occurs on the users' local machines before being sent to the aggregator.

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Re:Studying how Firefox can collect additional data in a pri... by Sir_Substance on Wednesday August 23, 2017 @03:56AM (#15079469)

>Is that not what apple is doing?

I don't know, is it? How would I check, if I consider apple an untrusted actor?

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