Re:Cracking random number generators (xoroshiro128+)
by bradleyjg on Tuesday August 22, 2017 @09:56AM
(#15072405)
After an initial seeding the only thing additional entropy adds is limiting the damage from a compromise of the internal state of the PRNG. And if the OS's internal PRNG state is compromised, what makes you think your process isn't?
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Re:Cracking random number generators (xoroshiro128+)
by DiThi on Tuesday August 22, 2017 @08:37PM
(#15077561)
What if you're using several PRNGs XORed together and reseeded frequently?
Re:Cracking random number generators (xoroshiro128+)
by bradleyjg on Wednesday August 23, 2017 @02:09PM
(#15083719)
Why would you want to do that?
Re:Cracking random number generators (xoroshiro128+)
by DiThi on Wednesday August 23, 2017 @06:24PM
(#15085721)
That would make much more difficult (if not impossible) to guess the internal state of all RNGs.
Re:Cracking random number generators (xoroshiro128+)
by bradleyjg on Wednesday August 23, 2017 @06:36PM
(#15085796)
You can't guess the internal state of a CSPRNG based on the output. That's what makes it CS. The only way to get the internal state is to break the OS protection and look at the memory directly. And if the attacker can do that, then they can do it for the multiple PRNG version too.