It's not just "culturally alien"; it's a straight-up error.
> Solution: only allow trades that are in accord with the students' submitted preferences. That is, if Alice prefers Central to Devonshire, and Bob prefers Devonshire to Central, then we could allow Alice and Bob to switch if their submitted rankings indicated that these moves were consistent with their desires. There would be no incentive to lie.
It's not obvious to me that this is true? Relevant discussion over on /r/math: https://www.reddit.com/r/math/comments/6uyfle/why_a_dutch_co...
It isn't an 'error', it is just a decision that they don't want strategy to be a factor.
You can do no harm and still be unfair. Whether that is bad or not is subjective, but it is still unfair (in the sense that every kid has an equal chance at the cookie).
>By trading places, students could get another shot at a place. At schools for which they already had a go in the lottery. This would give them better chances. At the expense of students that don’t (or can’t) trade. This is unfair.
The emphasized part is what I'm objecting to. Sorry about that.
The logic is similar for the school lotto as people would target schools based on their ability to trade not necessarily their actual preference. This would lower the odds of people who otherwise had fewer options.
AKA, if only bob or sam want a spot sam's odds are 50/50%. But, of ted joins but would always give his spot to bob then sam's odds are 1/3 and bob's odds are 2/3.
It also gives folks an incentive to pressure others to make specific choices, and empowers the informal network of people in the know.
>It's not obvious to me that this is true?
Even if you could solve the game theory issues, you wouldn't solve the problem of people selling spots in desirable schools.
Perhaps this can be remedied by automatic trading and another lottery, determining the order in which people get to trade, but that still doesn't solve the problem with strategic choices.
> It's not just "culturally alien"; it's a straight-up error.
Perhaps an exaggerated example will illustrate. Students are assigned by a lottery system that sometimes allows pairs (or triplets, etc) of students to have a beneficial trade. Then students are permitted to use dutch-school-trading.com to swap schools. Except that students who own computers are permitted to engage in this extra round of trading while students who do not own computers are not. Some consider this to be biased against students who don't own a computer.
In reality, it's not the single factor of "owns a computer" which is at play, but multiple issues including social connectedness, strategic thinking, free time on the day the placements are published, and so forth.
I think though that it would still be possible to game for any variant I can think up.
Only in the short run it isn't. On the long run, school trading creates incentives which make the entire system worse.
So you're not just optimizing for a single round of students, you're optimizing for the future rounds of students. And pareto-optimal makes no sense when you're looking at future rounds with different students.
But you could create a pareto-optimal analogy: allowing two students now to trade place in a seemingly pareto-optimal way would actually harm other students when you look at the future rounds, so the trade actually isn't pareto-optimal.
So it isn't an error, it's working as intended.
It's not even designed to deal with repeat situation, incentives and strategizing. It just looks at the outcome and says: is this optimal?
That's exactly what I'm saying:
> And pareto-optimal makes no sense when you're looking at future rounds with different students.
And that's why I talked about a time-series analogy of pareto-optimality:
> But you could create a pareto-optimal analogy: allowing two students now to trade place in a seemingly pareto-optimal way would actually harm other students when you look at the future rounds, so the trade actually isn't pareto-optimal.
In that sense, you don't just look at the students selecting now, but at the future students as well. In that case, allowing trades now leads to dissatisfaction in the future, so while allowing trades now might seem to lead to a pareto-optimal scenario, it doesn't lead to a time-series-pareto-optimal scenario.
In that case, allowing trades now leads to dissatisfaction in the future. So, while allowing trades now might seem to lead to a pareto-optimal scenario, it doesn't lead to a time-series-pareto-optimal scenario.
The idea is to make an algorithm that performs a Pareto-optimal assignment algorithmically, so that no possible mutually advantageous trades exist when it is done. It's totally possible for an algorithm to do that, and the current Dutch one clearly doesn't.
One possible way is to run the current algorithm, and then as long as the solution is not Pareto-optimal, perform a swap at random from the set of all pairs of students where swapping would improve both of their preferences. This can be proven to converge with sufficient steps. Doing this kind of swap algorithmically has nothing to do with "allowing trades". I'm calling them "swaps" instead of "trades" here to make clear there is no manual action involved on the part of the students.
I hope this clarifies what I meant, and why objecting to "allowing trades" does not make sense as a response.
This is just false. You're still incentivized to place popular schools farther up than you otherwise would.
Say you have some true preferences:
Heaventy
Nirvana
Populonopolous
Shitsville
Say you decide to list Populonopolous higher than Nirvana, even though you would ultimately like Nirvana better. There isn't space at Heaventy, so you are initially assigned to Populonopolous. This won't help you get into Nirvana, because you can't trade downward on your preference list. But as long as someone else got assigned to Heaventy that would have preferred Populonopolous, you could trade with them.
[1] http://web.stanford.edu/~niederle/SFUSDBoardPresentationFeb....
I don't think that this is culture. I believe that this is just math. If we devise some system that solves some optimization problem, we shouldn't meddle with that system by other means, like "common sense". We can use common sense to find possible improvements to the system, but we shouldn't apply this improvements without checking them with science laying behind system. Unchecked common sense can break system's promises entirely.
> Solution: only allow trades that are in accord with the students' submitted preferences. That is, if Alice prefers Central to Devonshire, and Bob prefers Devonshire to Central, then we could allow Alice and Bob to switch if their submitted rankings indicated that these moves were consistent with their desires. There would be no incentive to lie.
How could we know their desires? If Alice and Bob start to think creatively about it and find a way to lie about desires? Maybe they find some tradeoffs, like less chance to get into their top school against more chance to be able to trade then?
The more complex system is, the more loopholes in it, the more complex and obscure strategies becomes available.
I think there was some similar reasoning in a Florida school vouchers case. (Which might've more recently been overturned?) Opponents of the vouchers program argued that the Florida constitution required education to be "uniform":
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/15/us/school-vouchers-are-rul...
The results are very predictable -- you can look at what happens when religious adherents take over school districts. The public schools die.
I send my son to catholic school for various reasons. It's my choice and my cost, and the school provides scholarships to help those less able.
In my state, only a few things common to all students are provided/funded by the state in private schools: non-religious textbooks, school nurses, some transportation and limited bussing to special education.
Personally, I'm comfortable with that model. I am uncomfortable with the state supporting any church, including my own.
In California for instance, 57% of school funding comes directly from the state, so that's no change in funding source.
Personally, I don't see a difference between funding a religious school and a secular private school, both are capable of following a particular philosophical bent and applying it liberally or dogmatically.
To be honest, I think the idea that we can fund any philosophy except one that touches on cosmology (i.e. religion) is an unnatural discrimination against religion.
To be fair, there is an incentive to lie when you add neighborhood and other preferences to the system. Say Sally, who wants Central, lives near Devonshire and thus is given better odds of getting a spot there. If Dick wants Devonshire but doesn't really care about Central, it gives him incentive to lie and rank Central higher to increase his chances of swapping with Alice.
Far from an exotic scenario, this is exactly what happens in the SFUSD system.
This is culturally alien to me; the students receiving the benefit are not harming other students.
>Another argument, that is related, is about strategizing. Students were told (correctly) that their best strategy was to give their true preferences. If trading were allowed, this would not be true. It would pay off for students to put popular schools high on their list. A spot at these schools would be good trading material.
Solution: only allow trades that are in accord with the students' submitted preferences. That is, if Alice prefers Central to Devonshire, and Bob prefers Devonshire to Central, then we could allow Alice and Bob to switch if their submitted rankings indicated that these moves were consistent with their desires. There would be no incentive to lie.