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Re:How complex systems fail (2002) [pdf] by rossdavidh on Sunday August 13, 2017 @01:48PM (#15003968)
This all looks spot on from my experience, except I have this nagging voice in my head that says the methods they are criticizing, seem to be exactly what the airline industry has done for decades in the wake of plane accidents. The result has been an ever-improving safety record, without preventing normal operation; although it is a pain to get through security at the airport, people do in fact continue to get from here to there. So, how do the methods they criticize here, differ from the airline industry's, or if they don't what's the flaw in this analysis?
Re:How complex systems fail (2002) [pdf] by adrianratnapala on Sunday August 13, 2017 @03:25PM (#15004457)
I know nothing of the industry, so everything that follows is guesswork.

I'd say airlines are a sweet spot because we are probably near a technological local-optimum. We are not constantly evolving new paradigms for the industry, rather just incrementally improving the old one.

If post-mortem culture in the industry results in "fighting the last war", then that probably does little harm, at worst it adds in incremental cost. In the mean-time there is still incremental techonolgical improvment giving us more head-room in the cost vs. safety trade-off.

Re:How complex systems fail (2002) [pdf] by rossdavidh on Sunday August 13, 2017 @04:30PM (#15004778)
Well this makes some sense, since the speed of sound pretty much stopped technological progress toward every-higher speeds a few decades past.
Re:How complex systems fail (2002) [pdf] by jodrellblank on Sunday August 13, 2017 @07:03PM (#15005469)
Really?

The ancient ones, the humans who lived before my birth - those who launched rockets to the moon and detonated city destroying bombs with atomic power, feats no country has matched in these declining years of civilisation - they also had faster than sound passenger aircraft.

Although it might be the tendency to exaggerate stories with time, rose-tinted glasses and the myth of the noble-savage.

Re:How complex systems fail (2002) [pdf] by taneq on Sunday August 13, 2017 @07:17PM (#15005530)
There's a common theme amongst many of those heroic feats: They tended to occasionally catch fire, fall out of the sky and/or explode at inopportune times.

It's the difference between prototype and a production. The Saturn V rocket and the Concorde were both prototype-grade vehicles. The marvel of them is that they worked at all. Now that we've proved the point, we won't put either "into production" unless it's reliable enough to be boring.

Re:How complex systems fail (2002) [pdf] by jodrellblank on Sunday August 13, 2017 @10:32PM (#15006277)
'Production quality' things spontaneously catch fire these days, too.

http://www.theclever.com/20-dangerous-cars-with-the-highest-...

Re:How complex systems fail (2002) [pdf] by di4na on Sunday August 13, 2017 @07:38PM (#15005625)
Except not.

The air safety Human Factor culture have moved away from what they criticise 30 years ago. They are now fully on Safety II.

I advise Steven Shorrock work recently at https://humanisticsystems.com