Re:A Systematic Analysis of the Juniper Dual EC Incident [pdf]
by pbsd on Tuesday August 08, 2017 @04:58PM
(#14962637)
I don't think it was the NSA either, but do note that Juniper itself had originally Q set to a different value than the recommended one, and then _that_ value was modified.
Re:A Systematic Analysis of the Juniper Dual EC Incident [pdf]
by tptacek on Tuesday August 08, 2017 @05:15PM
(#14962775)
Right, the "original" code is also super shady! I like (but don't believe) the story where the later backdoor was actually USG, but done to break some other country's NOBUS backdoor.
Re:A Systematic Analysis of the Juniper Dual EC Incident [pdf]
by slackingoff2017 on Wednesday August 09, 2017 @06:55AM
(#14967342)
I think the NSA offered to "help" them implement Dual_EC since nobody was using it. That would explain the backdoor stopping the extra safety feature that avoided using it alone.
I have a suspicion that the NSA had access to their source at some point.
The smoking gun for this backdoor was a modified Q, which NSA wouldn't have to do, and which represents truly spectacularly bad tradecraft, by drawing attention to a backdoor NSA claims isn't a backdoor in a way that leaves virtually no doubt that it's a backdoor.