A Systematic Analysis of the Juniper Dual EC Incident [pdf]

Re:A Systematic Analysis of the Juniper Dual EC Incident [pdf] by kbart on Tuesday August 08, 2017 @06:14AM (#14956222)

Open source baseband only won't be enough, there are plenty of CPUs/MCUs capable of running backdoors/malware spread on any modern board (heck, even battery controller often runs on a full fledged MCU). Until we have an open hardware + software, we will never be safe from government and other well-funded crooks.

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Re:A Systematic Analysis of the Juniper Dual EC Incident [pdf] by jwfxpr on Tuesday August 08, 2017 @06:57AM (#14956472)

> Open source baseband only won't be enough,

Not sufficient, perhaps, but necessary. A 0-day in baseband firmware seems a helluva lot more attractive a target than in a battery controller MCU.

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Re:A Systematic Analysis of the Juniper Dual EC Incident [pdf] by ethbro on Tuesday August 08, 2017 @08:38AM (#14957145)

Exactly. Such is the entire point of a firewall.

If you don't have a remotely exploitable vulnerability, it doesn't scale to global panopticon levels.

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Re:A Systematic Analysis of the Juniper Dual EC Incident [pdf] by adrianratnapala on Tuesday August 08, 2017 @06:51PM (#14963723)

Let not the perfect be the enemy of the good though.

Every time I hear someone asking for some improvement in openness and security, someone jumps in to point out how something else will circumvent it. Fine -- but how is anything going to get done if we sit paralysed a proliferation of worries?

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