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Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by aidenn0 on Monday July 31, 2017 @04:02PM (#14895419)
I think a hybrid solution makes the most sense.

Each voting machine tallies votes and prints out a filled-in paper ballot. Then you get quick electronic counting but with an auditable trail.

Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by nickbauman on Monday July 31, 2017 @04:12PM (#14895489)
We already have the reverse and it works better. You fill out a paper ballot. You feed the ballot into an optical tallying machine. The tallying machine is just an efficiency measure. The paper ballot is the record of the vote. It can be audited statistically and/or manually.
Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by aidenn0 on Tuesday August 01, 2017 @04:03AM (#14898662)
I'm going to disagree that that is a clear win over my idea.

There are definitely issues with printing paper ballots (low toner, running out of supplies at polling locations, handling cases where the voter discovers an error after printing &c.), but similarly there are problems with optical tallying machines (e.g. hanging chads, incompletely filled in bubbles).

Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by nickbauman on Sunday August 13, 2017 @12:16PM (#15003460)
Optical machines do not have chads. Those are "punch card" machines. The low toner comment doesn't make any sense. The ballots are printed BEFORE the election. If you get a ballot that you can't read, you can return it to the pollster, they will mark the ballot as "unusable" and give you another. I know this because I've done this when I accidentally filled in the wrong circle. It's SOP.

Incompletely filled-in bubbles is a real problem, true, but in my experience I've never seen this.