Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon
by radarsat1 on Monday July 31, 2017 @10:04AM
(#14892051)
> what have we achieved other than adding another few layers of middlemen and cost?
and uncertainty. In principle the idea of hitting a button and having the non-networked machine spit out a paper trail that can be electronically counted sounds like a good compromise. But this leaves 1 or potentially 2 sources of uncertainty that are not necessary: (1) that what the machine prints actually corresponds to what you wanted and (2) that the counting machine actually counts what it says on the paper.
(1) is not such a risk if you can verify it visually before submitting. There do exist I believe some ideas in cryptography to allow you carry a record of your vote that allows you to verify it without revealing the choice, these could have interesting application here, but I don't know the pros and cons.
(2) is even a risk in the non-machine case, although it can be mitigated by having multiple independent parties do the count. But it can't easily be done by machine and have the same level of certainty.
and uncertainty. In principle the idea of hitting a button and having the non-networked machine spit out a paper trail that can be electronically counted sounds like a good compromise. But this leaves 1 or potentially 2 sources of uncertainty that are not necessary: (1) that what the machine prints actually corresponds to what you wanted and (2) that the counting machine actually counts what it says on the paper.
(1) is not such a risk if you can verify it visually before submitting. There do exist I believe some ideas in cryptography to allow you carry a record of your vote that allows you to verify it without revealing the choice, these could have interesting application here, but I don't know the pros and cons.
(2) is even a risk in the non-machine case, although it can be mitigated by having multiple independent parties do the count. But it can't easily be done by machine and have the same level of certainty.