Ehh. It's Friday and I want some cake.
Having said that, some good old fashioned network segmentation would be a "win", too. Default deny ACLs should be the norm, and hosts sshould only be able to communicate with hosts they actually need to, full stop. (The reactions I get from developers, however, are typically less than pleasant when they learn that environments I administer have such policies, however.)
I recall being at Defcon in the 90s listening to the cDc folks talking about this.
https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/m...
and/or:
https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/d...
Getting a hash is rather simple, if you already have access to the lan, assuming you are able to redirect traffic or insert yourself between the target user and the network (say, false wifi ap):
https://shellgam3.com/2016/03/14/capturing-and-cracking-ntlm...
I'm generally not much of fan of firewalls (precisely because they by definition set up a "soft core" that's assumed to be safe) - but egress filtering of smb packets is unfortunately necessary if you have an winodws (and/or smb/cifs) clients on your network. I would much rather only run boxes that are "fit for the Internet" - but that's been rather difficult to do with windows for the past decades.
In fairness, Microsoft has made a number of improvements - but still not enough.
It would be nice if there was an easy way to set up the network so all clients used only kerberos5, and only sent credentials to kerberos principals in a trusted domain. As far as I know, there is no such easy way.
See: https://blog.preempt.com/new-ldap-rdp-relay-vulnerabilities-...
That's frightening, and I wonder if there are any exploits in the wild which do just that?