Your point is undermined by your links. The first describes a remote network exploit, which is not developed by coöperation or coercion. Exploits take advantage of a software vulnerability to insert additional capabilities (espionage). I think you wanted to find a link describing the process of interdiction, which was implied to exist in the Snowden documents.

The second link is just a public denial by Check Point. I'm not sure why you're implying these companies coöperate with their governments. A discovered back door would destroy Kaspersky, Huawei, Cisco, Check Point, etc.; nobody would renew their contracts with that massive loss of trust.

I do think you raise an excellent point. The actual reality that these companies aren't providing back doors is not relevant when the perception is that they are. The greatest risk is not coöperation, but of remote exploitation of the software. It turns out that there are a few major countries known for conducting network exploitation campaigns, unrelated to the country of origin of the target software. Just as the Stuxnet guys were almost certainly not German, yet they had a vulnerability in Siemens software, and the NotPetya authors didn't exert physical influence over ME.Doc in Ukraine, attackers have little to do with where the software was built.

As long as a government acts "scary", however, it makes companies feel less secure in the software, which affects sales. I'm not singling out software and hardware procurement officers; the "feels = reals" phenomenon is a human condition.