The result is the similar if one was to calculate such trajectories, but I am not sure what happens in the mind can be called calculation. How can it be properly tested that brain indeed calculates trajectories when catching a ball? Would practicing catching ball improve their relevant mathematical abilities demonstrable on paper?
This is a substantial oversimplification of course (there are many more factors involved than how fast the ball is growing in the visual field), but I think the point is clear enough. I doubt there's any trigonometry happening in the brain's circuitry; it seems much more plausible to me that the brain is really good at remembering how it felt in previous circumstances, recognizing how those remembered circumstances relate to the current one, and trying to adjust.
As I understand it, this is actually a significant debate in cognitive science, philosophy of mind, and related fields. One prominent proponent of a view like the one I've expressed here, that the brain doesn't require or use heavy math to do things like catch flying objects but rather acquires the ability over time through experience, is John Searle. He is known for using the example of his dog's ability to catch a ball that's bounced off a wall when discussing and arguing against theories of mind that propose that all unconscious processes must be following algorithms or rules (like running through computations to figure out how to catch a ball). Here's a quote of his from the BBC program Horizons (quote found in "New Technologies in Language Learning and Teaching", issue 532, on page 37 [1]):
If my dog can catch a ball that's bounced off the wall, that may be
just a skill he's acquired. The alternative view (the pro-AI view)
would say: "Look, if the dog can catch the ball it can only be
because he knows the rule: go to the point where the angle of
incidence equals equals the angle of reflection in a plane where the
flatness of the trajectory is a function of the impact velocity
divided by the coefficient of friction" - or something like that.
Now, it seems to me unreasonable to think that my dog really *knows*
that. It seems to me more reasonable to suppose he just learns how
to look for where the ball is going and jumps *there*. And a lot of
our behavior is like that as well. We've acquired a lot of skills,
but we don't have to suppose that, in order to acquire these skills,
the skills have got to be based on our mastery of some complex
intellectual structure. For an awful lot of things, we just *do* it.
[1] https://books.google.com/books?id=fWQhj0HVCbUC&pg=PA37&lpg=P...My point is that 'feeling' or 'muscle memory' is the execution of (super hacky, ad hoc and efficient) algorithm, the big difference between computer calculation and brain calculation being that the brain is far more plastic than the computer. Presumably in an insects mind the 'muscle memory' is hardcoded (deliberately reductionist here), whereas we have a conscious mind that can train and 'program' our unconscious mind.
In your quote, 'we just do it' is ignoring the great complexity of the human mind that can perform complex interconnected tasks with seemingly no effort at all, if it has been trained properly. Replace training with programming, and the parallels are there - graphics programming for instance is a huge collection of hacks and rules of thumb to get something that looks like perspective and light. Like our brain, it's results orientated so it truly doesn't matter if it's not 'correct'.
Now of course the brain and computers are different, but it's incorrect to say the brain doesn't calculate - it just is a lot more unwieldy to program than a computer.
Translating maths into a mess of symbols and deconstructing it consciously is of course a laborious process - but AFAIK no computer is good at that either.
My own personal metaphor is the conscious mind as programmer and the unconscious mind as computer. If I correctly program my unconscious mind I can spontaneously realize the right answer far faster than I can understand why.