Now, there are some great arguments to be made that software security in those buildings should also be improved, but that literally doesn't matter if someone has physical access. At best you're delaying.
Physical access trumps everything. There is no software on the planet that can prevent a determined attacker with physical access.
Software attacks are often far far amplified and harder to trace than their in person counterpart.
The whole freaking article is about companies paying specialists to see how secure their farms are.
My issue is that the article glides past the "physical access" part to focus on the "scary cyber weapons" part.
That's bullshit. If it was a remote exploit from an internet connected machine, sure: that's scary.
This wasn't that.
At some point you are going to have to focus on the network part of security. Getting physical access to one Google server shouldn't allow you to bring down all of Google.
Their "hack", which requires physical access, is about as practical as throwing a physical spanner in the mechanics.
EDIT: I'd like to point out, there are reasons why you might want to be able to access the SCADA system of other wind turbines, from the network access of one wind turbine, which would be to allow wind-yaw optimising wind lidar systems to optimise the yaw of other, local, turbines.