Re:Container Isolation Gone Wrong
by icebraining on Thursday June 29, 2017 @01:46AM
(#14661059)
How is that the best? You're still running a full kernel for each container, rather than sharing it.
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But, so what? VMWare under the hood is sharing common pages between VMs, and a kernel that isn't doing anything isn't consuming any CPU, so why not?
Re:Container Isolation Gone Wrong
by icebraining on Thursday June 29, 2017 @01:55AM
(#14661090)
Nope, common pages are no longer shared between VMs, because it was demonstrated that was a bad idea, security-wise:
upcoming ESXi Update releases will no longer enable TPS between Virtual Machines by default
https://kb.vmware.com/selfservice/microsites/search.do?langu...
Re:Container Isolation Gone Wrong
by AstralStorm on Thursday June 29, 2017 @03:26AM
(#14661429)
Guess what, if it is a bad idea for a VM, it must be exponentially worse for something less isolated.
Re:Container Isolation Gone Wrong
by icebraining on Thursday June 29, 2017 @03:32AM
(#14661446)
Yes. Thankfully, the point is that using the regular container model you don't need memory page sharing, because there's only one kernel anyway, not a copy per each container.
Re:Container Isolation Gone Wrong
by AstralStorm on Thursday June 29, 2017 @06:47AM
(#14662155)
Page cache and disk cache are quite shared between containers...
Re:Container Isolation Gone Wrong
by icebraining on Thursday June 29, 2017 @07:31AM
(#14662325)
And they share a CPU, too. Please come back with an actual point (like a link describing a attack on encryption using that shared cache), as I don't have time to make one for you.
Administrators may revert to the previous behavior if they so wish.
Sounds like a sane change to the defaults, but anyone who isn't securing against 3rd party code can turn it back on (to return to much more Docker-like security/performance).