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Re:Consciousness and its Place in Nature (2002) by pmoriarty on Friday June 23, 2017 @11:48PM (#14624279)
I don't think that's it. The real problem is that no science (whether physics, chemistry, biology, or even psychology -- if you deign to call the latter a science) describe what it's like to experience anything. Certainly there are measurements (like the wavelength of light), or even observations (ex: that a certain light was in the red spectrum), but the actual subjective experience of any phenomena seems to be completely out of reach. No one and no scientific theory can tell you what any experience is going to be like for you. For instance, no scientific theory can tell you what seeing the color red is like.

This actually goes far beyond the lack of a way for science to grapple with subjective experience, and goes to the root of communicating that experience or even communicating about that experience. It's hard, if not impossible, to communicate what any subjective experience is like. Poets, musicians, or artists might arguably be able to get at it, through some indirect means. But until telepathy comes along, there's really no way to know if what one person describes as their experience really is that way or can even be properly understood by their audience.

The ideal that many scientists aim for creates an additional burden of trying to be "objective" and of distrusting reporting on individual's own subjective experiences. Nevertheless, at least in psychology, neurology, and cognitive science, self-reporting on personal experiences is still quite common and is at least tacitly accepted. Researchers may ask, for instance, if the subject feels pain, or about their emotional state, and so forth. That is not completely out of bounds. I'm not aware of so-called "hard sciences" being very interested in what personal experience is like, or in attempting to bring them under their theoretical rubric.

Re:Consciousness and its Place in Nature (2002) by Smaug123 on Saturday June 24, 2017 @04:36AM (#14624875)
"Poets, musicians, or artists might arguably be able to get at it, through some indirect means."

It's worth being explicit that poets can only even attempt to communicate these things to other humans, since human consciousnesses share a very large common base of properties. Similarly, affection is something most mammals [seem to] experience, but only because we've had a common number of millions of years of evolution, meaning that our brains are built to follow the same patterns; affection is not logically entailed by consciousness any more than the sensation of "red" is.

Re:Consciousness and its Place in Nature (2002) by red75prime on Saturday June 24, 2017 @05:13AM (#14624973)
> For instance, no scientific theory can tell you what seeing the color red is like.

Science doesn't stand out here. Nothing can tell you what it is like to see infrared.

Modifying your retinal cells and waiting, while your brain teaches itself to process new information, is a way to know how it will look like for you. But you still will be unable to convey this information, which raises a question: is it still an information if it cannot be conveyed.

Re:Consciousness and its Place in Nature (2002) by pmoriarty on Saturday June 24, 2017 @10:56AM (#14625789)
I think it is information if it can not be conveyed. The other day I was sitting at a table and reading, and my attention happened to be drawn to the table top as I tried to think of the name for its color, but I was momentarily stumped. I couldn't think of a name for the color, as it wasn't a primary color but was kind of a mix of colors.

I spent a few seconds in this state, where I was clearly aware of the color and consciously thinking of it, and was in no sense puzzled by the color itself but only lacking a name for it. Then I decided it was a mix of colors that was kind of blue-green. To me it seems the pre-linguistic, conscious awareness that I had of the color of the table was information that I had, but information that I could at least momentarily not communicate.

Re:Consciousness and its Place in Nature (2002) by gus_massa on Saturday June 24, 2017 @12:30AM (#14624357)
Is there any proof that we are not only philosophical zombies, i.e. a loosely defined bunch of atoms?
Re:Consciousness and its Place in Nature (2002) by taneq on Saturday June 24, 2017 @12:44AM (#14624397)
It goes right back to 'I think, therefore I am. I think.
Re:Consciousness and its Place in Nature (2002) by gus_massa on Sunday June 25, 2017 @08:16AM (#14629682)
Pzombies are so cute. They "believe" that they believe that they can think.