It's worth being explicit that poets can only even attempt to communicate these things to other humans, since human consciousnesses share a very large common base of properties. Similarly, affection is something most mammals [seem to] experience, but only because we've had a common number of millions of years of evolution, meaning that our brains are built to follow the same patterns; affection is not logically entailed by consciousness any more than the sensation of "red" is.
Science doesn't stand out here. Nothing can tell you what it is like to see infrared.
Modifying your retinal cells and waiting, while your brain teaches itself to process new information, is a way to know how it will look like for you. But you still will be unable to convey this information, which raises a question: is it still an information if it cannot be conveyed.
I spent a few seconds in this state, where I was clearly aware of the color and consciously thinking of it, and was in no sense puzzled by the color itself but only lacking a name for it. Then I decided it was a mix of colors that was kind of blue-green. To me it seems the pre-linguistic, conscious awareness that I had of the color of the table was information that I had, but information that I could at least momentarily not communicate.
This actually goes far beyond the lack of a way for science to grapple with subjective experience, and goes to the root of communicating that experience or even communicating about that experience. It's hard, if not impossible, to communicate what any subjective experience is like. Poets, musicians, or artists might arguably be able to get at it, through some indirect means. But until telepathy comes along, there's really no way to know if what one person describes as their experience really is that way or can even be properly understood by their audience.
The ideal that many scientists aim for creates an additional burden of trying to be "objective" and of distrusting reporting on individual's own subjective experiences. Nevertheless, at least in psychology, neurology, and cognitive science, self-reporting on personal experiences is still quite common and is at least tacitly accepted. Researchers may ask, for instance, if the subject feels pain, or about their emotional state, and so forth. That is not completely out of bounds. I'm not aware of so-called "hard sciences" being very interested in what personal experience is like, or in attempting to bring them under their theoretical rubric.