I think when people mention the "reals" they are usually referring to the uncountable reals, which you can't construct, compute, name, or know:
https://arxiv.org/abs/math/0404335
...(maybe skip to chapter 5 to get to the meat of it). So constructivists don't believe in those types of numbers, and so get "choice" as a theorem instead of an axiom.
In some constructive versions of math you get weird things like there being an injection from R to N but there not being a bijection due to diagonalization.
I think you are confusing computable/nameable with constructive as that term is used by most mathematicians.
Note that Chaitan's Constant is not computable.
The common criticism of AC is Banach-Tarski. So if you don't agree with Banach-Tarski and want every subset of R to be measurable then you have to conclude an equally bizarre result.
As an algebraist I accepted AC. Instead of constantly saying, "let V be a vector space over k with a basis" it's easier to just assume all vector spaces have a basis. I think analysts need AC more than other branches, The Intermediate Value Theorem isn't provable without AC. I think.
The case of measure theory is particularly interesting, though, since you don't even need to change your underlying logic to get a better model. For instance, if you base your "measure theory" on valuations on locales instead of measures on sigma algebras then the theory itself becomes simpler and the Banach-Tarski "paradox" goes away.
Briefly, in locale theory, your "measure" is defined on sublocales instead of subsets. While there are more sublocales than subsets, the condition for when two sublocales are disjoint is stronger. This is what breaks the Banach-Tarski construction. The orbit subsets used in Banach-Tarski still exist, but while they are disjoint as sets, they are not disjoint as sublocales and thus don't decompose the volume of the sphere.
Here is a reference to a mathiverflow comment.
This is really interesting to know, and was exactly the type of think that I was wondering about. And I assume the author felt similarly although didn't draw identical conclusions.
Out of curiosity could you describe or link me to this other theory?
- A theory with non-measurable sets is much simpler/more expressive than the alternatives and thus is still a useful tool.
- There is a simpler theory without this defect, which is at least as expressive when reasoning about real world phenomena.
In this case, the latter possibility turns out to be true. It is just unbelievably difficult to convince mathematicians to change the rules of the game, even if you can point to concrete gains.