How do you think the government will access end-to-end encrypted data without making use of a backdoor? (Or alerting the user.)

Brandis said warrants should be "sufficiently strong to require companies, if need be, to assist in response to a warrant to assist law enforcement or intelligence to decrypt a communication". A company which makes end-to-end encryption will not be able to assist law enforcement in this way unless they make a backdoor.

Conclusion: Brandis either doesn't know what a backdoor is, or he does know but realises that "backdoor" has negative connotations so he is pretending that that's not what it is. Both possibilities are pretty reprehensible in my opinion.

I take the second option, this is a man who tried to claim metadata is not data.

And it took them just a few weeks to breach the 'safe guards' in place for the warrantless data retention scheme.

Http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/police-illegally-obtained-journalists-phone-records-under-new-metadata-retention-regime-20170428-gvutjx.html

Or, they're just going to redefine the term "backdoor" so it doesn't include automated access to endpoints, which is what this attempt smells like it would require. They might not want to call such a thing a backdoor for marketing/political purposes, but it still would be one. It would not be backdooring the encryption, but backdooring the software driving the user-facing plaintext.

They're using doublespeak. They just want the same thing but they're trying to pretend they're asking for something different.

They think we're stupid like criminals too.

A rose by any other name