For NSA documents classified "top secret" they don't just watermark when printing, they watermark the text. How do they do this?

For NSA documents classified "top secret" they don't just watermark when printed they watermark the text. How?

They can also sprinkle typos:

For NSA documents clasified "top secret" they don't just watermark when printing, they watermark the text. How do they do this?

Another option: They'll include meaningless "extra" information after the text such as a glossary or word definitions or even just something that looks like background info copied from Wikipedia.

Of course, it all depends on how the document was obtained. The systems that modify texts in this way aren't used everywhere.

Yes it certainly is. The Intercept should have taken such precautions, but it's not very smart to assume that they always will take those precautions. If you want to be safe as the leaker, you'll have to either do that sort of thing yourself or communicate with The Intercept to make sure they will. Point is that you cannot really control how much caution third parties will take with your documents.

But like I said, the government has every incentive to make us question The Intercept's competence in these matters even though there are many ways the government could have found the leakers. Leakers _should_ be worried about these sorts of things, but we as the general populace should realize that this is perfect opportunity to make The Intercept look bad and to deter future leaks.

Blaming the leaker is failing the argument.

I'm not really sure what argument is failing. I'm certainly blaming the leaker for using bad opsec (sent emails to The Intercept using a work computer). I'm also certainly blaming The Intercept for using bad opsec. I'm also pointing out that the government has every incentive to act like it was The Intercept's bad opsec that allowed them to find the leaker even if they, for example, found who it was by just looking at access logs for the document.