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Re:Krypt.co raises 1.2M to securely store your SSH private k... by gruez on Monday June 05, 2017 @05:32PM (#14492305)
It's 1.2M for an app that doesn't meaningfully increase security. Let's suppose this thing gets somewhat popular. Now malware will detect the presence of this app, wait until a legitimate request gets initiated, and piggy back off that. You approve the request, the malware logs into your servers/repos, does whatever evil thing it needs to do, let the original app do its thing, and you're none the wiser.
Re:Krypt.co raises 1.2M to securely store your SSH private k... by arghwhat on Monday June 05, 2017 @06:02PM (#14492620)
You'd have to elaborate a bit on your theoretical attack here.

1. A request and its signed response can only be used for a specific login attempt by SSH design.

2. The app, through some nasty hacks, receive the host auth blob from the server to verify. If you skip this, the request will be labelled as from "unknown" to "warn" the user. Such request are never auto-accepted during "accept for 1h" periods.

3. The app has an internal known hosts list, so it denies attempts to just replicate hostname to trick the user.

4. The app has to be paired with each machine that can authenticate, or the key material must be stolen off a paired machine. "Timed" acceptance is per pairing basis, so abuse of that only works if you steal the right pairing. The app shows the name of the pairing when requesting approval.

If you want to trick the user to accept your request by firing it simultaneously with a legitimate one, you first have to steal pairing data from the machine the user is logging in from. Then, you'd either have to auth against the very same host as the user, or have the request say that the host is unknown (sticks out, seeing that the legitimate request is also there). There would also be two requests in a row, which might warn the user.

The other attack vector I can think of would be trying to accept a random request done by an attacker, either by tricking the user (clickjacking-style) or by using an exploit on the device.

A yubikey-like device with a screen displaying request information and a hardware approval method would be better than an arbitrary android device, but I would argue that the model presented by this piece of software isn't as bad as you make it sound.

Re:Krypt.co raises 1.2M to securely store your SSH private k... by baldfat on Monday June 05, 2017 @07:10PM (#14493144)
> s yet, there are no known exploitable vulnerabilities in SSH2, though information leaked by Edward Snowden in 2013 suggests the National Security Agency may be able to decrypt some SSH traffic. http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/Secure-Shell

I really don't understand how people continue to state wrong information about ssh. Is it because of Heart Bleed? SSH is 22 years old and is still a solid tool. The only bad thing about ssh is key management which this company is addressing.

Re:Krypt.co raises 1.2M to securely store your SSH private k... by fidget on Monday June 05, 2017 @07:19PM (#14493201)
There are other bad things about ssh. Tofu sucks balls and ssh users are far too comfortable with it.
Re:Krypt.co raises 1.2M to securely store your SSH private k... by voltagex_ on Monday June 05, 2017 @11:20PM (#14494480)
Had to look it up. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_on_first_use

What would you replace it with?

Re:Krypt.co raises 1.2M to securely store your SSH private k... by transitorykris on Tuesday June 06, 2017 @11:15AM (#14497862)
Signed keys. Here's an example of how to do it from Digital Ocean: https://www.digitalocean.com/community/tutorials/how-to-crea...
Re:Krypt.co raises 1.2M to securely store your SSH private k... by arghwhat on Tuesday June 06, 2017 @04:53AM (#14495760)
Well, feel free to come up with a better solution. 3rd party trust roots are way worse.
Re:Krypt.co raises 1.2M to securely store your SSH private k... by madmulita on Tuesday June 06, 2017 @08:57AM (#14496834)
The server key can be signed by a trusted authority, no need to trust on first use.
Re:Krypt.co raises 1.2M to securely store your SSH private k... by gruez on Monday June 05, 2017 @08:19PM (#14493632)
>1. A request and its signed response can only be used for a specific login attempt by SSH design.

>3. The app has an internal known hosts list, so it denies attempts to just replicate hostname to trick the user.

>4. The app has to be paired with each machine that can authenticate, or the key material must be stolen off a paired machine. "Timed" acceptance is per pairing basis, so abuse of that only works if you steal the right pairing. The app shows the name of the pairing when requesting approval.

So instead of being able to pwn all your machines, they can pwn all the machines that you connect to since the first compromise. Better than nothing, but only marginally since you probably visit your important machines somewhat frequently (+ opportunities to piviot between machines). This also means they can access all your github repos since they're on the same host.

>2. The app, through some nasty hacks, receive the host auth blob from the server to verify. If you skip this, the request will be labelled as from "unknown" to "warn" the user. Such request are never auto-accepted during "accept for 1h" periods.

Not relevant because there's little to gain from hitting a machine twice within an 1 hour window. There's no need to pwn a machine you already pwned.

Re:Krypt.co raises 1.2M to securely store your SSH private k... by arghwhat on Tuesday June 06, 2017 @04:51AM (#14495745)
> Not relevant because there's little to gain from hitting a machine twice within an 1 hour window. There's no need to pwn a machine you already pwned.

Of course it is relevant. It means that you're unlikely to get anything "pwned". When someone logs in, an authentic request towards host A will appear. Given your proposed attack, a fraudulent request would appear a few seconds later towards "unknown host". The only way such an attack would go through would be if the user was confused which request was the legitimate one (which is clear if one says "unknown"). Otherwise, the user will already have approved the legitimate one, either with a timed or direct approval, neither of which will apply to the fraudulent one.

> So instead of being able to pwn all your machines, they can pwn all the machines that you connect to since the first compromise. Better than nothing, but only marginally since you probably visit your important machines somewhat frequently (+ opportunities to piviot between machines). This also means they can access all your github repos since they're on the same host.

I am having trouble understanding your wording here, but I believe that you might have misunderstood "timed" approvals as being per login-target (e.g. "accept all github logins for 1 hour"), when they are per login-source (e.g. "accept all logins from my work machine for 1 hour").

If you get someone to do a "timed" approval, it means that you given the pairing data from the workstation that tried to login, you can perform any login within an hour towards any host. Such a timed approval is sort of a bad idea, but note that all approvals are still logged, so the user would at least be aware of the problem.

If the user doesn't do timed approvals, then you can only ever "pwn" one machine at a time. However, if the request shouldn't be obviously fraudulent, it would have to be towards a host the person uses often, and it would still have to be using pairing data from the workstation the user is currently working on.

Both such attacks fails the usual sanity check: It requires you to already have compromised the user so much that the attack is pointless to do. If you are able to obtain the kryptonite pairing data from a users workstation, needed to either use a timed approval or to make the request not look obviously fraudulent, then you also have the privileges to replace the ssh client with an evil one (e.g., one that signs evil login requests rather than the local one, one that creates persistent evil shell sessions, etc.).

With such privileges, all the users machine-local private keys would also be implicitly compromised. The kryptonite key could be abused, but would not be compromised (that is, hosts have been accessed with your privileges, but the key is still safe and does not need rotation).

Re:Krypt.co raises 1.2M to securely store your SSH private k... by hstern on Monday June 05, 2017 @10:39PM (#14494296)
>2. The app, through some nasty hacks, receive the host auth blob from the server to verify.

What do you mean here? is the host auth blob coming from the third party service you are trying to auth to (e.g. Github), or from the initial client making the auth request (e.g. "Request from Macbook")?

Re:Krypt.co raises 1.2M to securely store your SSH private k... by arghwhat on Tuesday June 06, 2017 @04:16AM (#14495595)
It puts a little nc-like tool as ProxyCommand, parsing all traffic for host-auth like packets coming from the target machine. It then sends it to the app, so that it can verify the signature of the remote host before prompting you for approval.
Re:Krypt.co raises 1.2M to securely store your SSH private k... by 5706906c06c on Monday June 05, 2017 @06:04PM (#14492627)
That's a fair assessment, I would imagine by the time the malware has made it on a host, none of what you mentioned is materially relevant given that malware has made its way on the host.
Re:Krypt.co raises 1.2M to securely store your SSH private k... by agrinman on Monday June 05, 2017 @05:41PM (#14492397)
Your attack vector is correct, but Kryptonite is still a step up from existing solutions since you know exactly when your key is used and what host is being logged in to (the app does known host pining as well).

YubiKeys don't have a UI to show you what you're approving plus suffer the same problem you described. Most developers store keys as files on their machine which can be easily stolen (even if they're encrypted on disk) and used to authenticate to as many servers as the adversary likes without you even knowing.

Re:Krypt.co raises 1.2M to securely store your SSH private k... by eeZi on Monday June 05, 2017 @06:35PM (#14492884)
But YubiKeys are built on a hardened hardware security module instead of a general purpose phone operating system with full network connectivity and a huge attack surface.

Having a UI does not increase security in a meaningful way. The attacker is just going to wait until the victim connects to an interesting target server and then hijack that connection. The ControlMaster feature makes that trivially easy, but it's not hard to do real injection [1].

If the workstation is compromised, it's over.

At that point, all you can do is to prevent an attacker from copying the key or using it without user interaction. A YubiKey does both - you can optionally set it to a mode where you have to approve each signature.

With a bank transaction, the whole transaction is part of the approval process and can be verified out-of-band. With a SSH login, this is not possible since you're still going to trust the workstation as soon as the session is established.

I'm not saying this project is useless - IF your phone is actually more secure than your workstation - which may or may not be the case - AND you've been previously been storing your keys on your workstation, then it's definitely a step up. But really, at that point, just buy a YubiKey (and properly secure your workstation!).

Otherwise, you now have TWO single points of failure instead of one. If either your phone or your laptop is compromised, it's over.

If you want login approvals that show the server name, do it as a second factor and use something like Duo Security with push approvals. This actually increases your security - instead of having, an attacker would now have to compromise both of your devices.

[1]: https://github.com/seastorm/PuttyRider

Re:Krypt.co raises 1.2M to securely store your SSH private k... by iancarroll on Monday June 05, 2017 @06:47PM (#14492988)
The iPhone has a secure enclave that does elliptic curve key generation and signing[0]. I'd be surprised if they do not implement that soon; it's not terribly difficult[1].

[0] https://twitter.com/iangcarroll/status/830878517730623492

[1] https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/1644033-s...

Re:Krypt.co raises 1.2M to securely store your SSH private k... by eeZi on Tuesday June 06, 2017 @09:02AM (#14496867)
Different story, then.