Re:Maybe we shouldn't skip SHA-3
by apendleton on Friday June 02, 2017 @01:33PM
(#14471802)
Would it also be fair to say that novel math could just as easily be discovered that would break SHA-3, and so, switching to SHA-3 would not reduce risk? (Or, worse: might it increase it, since the SHA-3 constructions have been subject to less cryptographic research and so might be more likely to fall to some kind of new math?)
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Re:Maybe we shouldn't skip SHA-3
by nincompope on Friday June 02, 2017 @03:40PM
(#14472750)
It's arguable that SHA-3 is better understood than SHA-2, at least in the open research community. The rationales behind every component of SHA-3 are well documented, and the design is very conservative, both in structure and number of rounds. More so than SHA-2.
It is in theory possible that a new technique could break SHA-3 and not SHA-2, but the opposite seems far more plausible.