Maybe we shouldn't skip SHA-3

Re:Maybe we shouldn't skip SHA-3 by baby on Friday June 02, 2017 @09:38AM (#14469760)

I addressed that point in the post. Unless you replace all the implementations of SHA-2, the deed is done. People will choose SHA-256 and SHA-512 because that's what they've always known.

> without requiring the adoption of new hashing code

I should have made myself clearer: I recommend SHA-3 for new projects. I wouldn't recommend people to switch to SHA-3 if they are already using SHA-2.

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Re:Maybe we shouldn't skip SHA-3 by tptacek on Friday June 02, 2017 @09:43AM (#14469785)

This is a little like saying that if you told someone to use Rijndael they might instead use DES.

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Re:Maybe we shouldn't skip SHA-3 by baby on Friday June 02, 2017 @11:19AM (#14470515)

I really don't agree. Rijndael and DES are different algorithm. SHA-512/256 is a made-up algorithm that you need to be aware of. Again I'm talking about "misuse" here. SHA-2 is vulnerable to misuse even if SHA-512/256 is not.

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Re:Maybe we shouldn't skip SHA-3 by dom0 on Friday June 02, 2017 @01:01PM (#14471463)

> SHA-512/256 is a made-up algorithm

It's a published FIPS.

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Re:Maybe we shouldn't skip SHA-3 by baby on Friday June 02, 2017 @06:46PM (#14473826)

didn't know that!

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Re:Maybe we shouldn't skip SHA-3 by tptacek on Friday June 02, 2017 @12:09PM (#14470958)

I think you're reaching here.

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Re:Maybe we shouldn't skip SHA-3 by baby on Friday June 02, 2017 @12:22PM (#14471087)

I might be a bit. Although, I don't feel like it's too far from the kind of misuse we've pointed out with nonce re-use in AES-GCM or nonce re-use in DSA/ECDSA.

Anyway that was my point! Just wanted to write it up :)

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