Of course the real answer is to avoid the business hostile USA (or at least the border)
https://www.aclu.org/other/constitution-100-mile-border-zone
There is, however, a "functional equivalent" of the border in every international airport that grants ICE these powers over arriving citizens (which makes sense).
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/does-a-constitution-free...
If there is any kind of setting that lets you control travel mode, border control could just make it standard procedure to change that setting.
And if you're not a US citizen, "I'm not physically able to unlock the account right now" doesn't buy you anything. There's no obligation that says if you do all you can physically do to accommodate their wishes, that you get to enter. If they want access, you either grant access or you get back on a plane. The only thing not having your 1Password credentials with you does is remove the choice of which you want to do.
In that sense, Travel Mode sort of defeats the purpose -- all the border agent needs to know is that Travel Mode exists, and then ask you to turn it off.
"No"
You just lied to someone at border control. Which is an offense.
Every vendors main business is in the USA. 95% of our clients are not in Canada.
If I want to avoid the USA, I would have to change industries... Which isn't gonna happen hopefully anytime soon.
I have to goto states 3x times a year and hate the traveling aspect going through customs (I have a trip in a few weeks, already dreading it).. but once I pass through the border, it is rather nice.
"Yes"
"Disable it"
"I can't. I left my password at home, and the account is tied to an email address I do not have access to."
I suppose they tell you to go home at that point. Such a sad state of affairs.
In reality, they do. They are not asking you for every password you know and access to all the remote systems you have access to, and any that you can get access to if you ask someone, etc, etc.
It's been said further down, but they can't possibly have carte blanche to compel that you reveal all data you have access to anywhere, which is what this would require.
The logical conclusion here, is to decide, what is more important: Gaining entry, or keeping your data. In the first case you're just fucked. If you get searched, you have to give up your stuff (even if you can claim you can't; they can then just not let you in). In the second, just encrypt your shit, rescind your request for entry when it looks like they might be interested in you and don't give up your password.
HN makes this much too complicated, again. And forgets that this is a legal and social problem, not a technical one.
Yep. There's this tendency to say "I beat their rules, so they have to let me go!" The CBP aren't fairies, they aren't bound to stay within some narrow precommitment. At least if you're not a US citizen, these things are almost totally discretionary. Not only can they bar you for not unlocking Facebook, they can bar your for genuinely not having Facebook if they decide you're lying. When even simple truth isn't a defense, clever tech tricks don't count for anything.
In my cynical moments, this outlook strikes me as a disease caused by excess programming - living in a world of contracts and invariants blinds people to how much of the world runs on "screw you, you know what I mean."
I think you are confusing TSA with CBP here.
This is exactly the approach I took with my password vault application (android only, far less well-known than 1password). I added a location-lock feature that allows the user to store a number of "safe locations" outside of which the vault simply will not decrypt, even if the correct password is entered.
The app also makes it very clear that location lock is enabled and that the user is outside of all "safe zones" and therefore will not unlock. The only way a border agent is getting access is to figure out the GPS coordinate encryption method and adding a new set into the sqlite db or physically driving to one of the safe locations and unlocking it there.
Do they provide wifi for that? I doubt it.
In addition to removing the data from the device, cheers, don't you also need to be able to honestly say you can not provide access to it?
Ways to honestly answer, "not possible", and mean it:
- schedule a time period where no password is accepted. - enable whitelist/blacklist zones via geolocation. - set a new password that you give to a trusted friend/coworker/spouse that you must contact to retrieve.
Some combination of the above for ease-of-use, and ploys like emailing yourself the new password after a period of time for redundancy/safety.