The Royal Navy differs from the British Army in taking a more holistic view of traditions and history. Trafalgar is celebrated by all every year, Taranto is celebrated by all aviators every year - rather than only those descended from units involved. This combined with the length of time to draw lessons from has led to the saying "The Navy has traditions, the Army history and the Air Force has habits. And nasty, dirty habits they are too".
And yeah, bottle of whisky on your leave and you can't work on subs anymore (though you do get to keep the Dolphin pin apparently).
Note that in modern Russia there is a military tradition "Russians do not give up!" which many soldiers, especially the special forces, adhere to. This is partly what drove the rebels in Donbass to stand their ground in the face of apparently superior forces. Combined with the fact that they were literally defending their homes and families, the Ukraine army had difficulty making and holding any advances against them.
War is one of those areas where ideology does not seem to have a role, but if you expand ideology to include the internal psychology of the soldiers and their beliefs and motivations, then ideology may indeed be paramount. It's the political ideology that is meaningless. This is seen in WWII Soviet Union where Stalin relaxed the strict Communist ideology in favor of one of family, motherland, ethnic spirit.
To me, the only question is whether Beatty misused his battlecruisers or whether they were fatally flawed to begin with: whether their speed advantage was really worth anything. And whether the result would be a total British victory rather that just a strategic one.
As for the overall point, success breeds overconfidence, which breeds failure, and so on.
The synopsis / review this book offers is a good one but it could, perhaps, be generalised. Though Gordon doesn't make it explicit as such, the lesson I ended up taking away from the book is that cultures tend to go through alternating periods of encouraging initiative or obedience. You can see this in armies (perhaps the classic example is the Prussian / German army: it started off with Frederick the Great as an army of obedience; became (at the top levels at least) an army of initiative under von Moltke the Elder; and (in the West, at least) went back to an army of obedience for most of WWI), technology (look at any well known company's research lab culture), and even wider society. If I had to briefly summarise the consequences of this, it tends to come down to when two broadly equal organisations square up against each other: if one uses obedience as its model, and the other initiative, the latter will tend to win; if the two both use the same system, the outcome seems to be mostly random.
[That said, Jutland isn't a great example of this in my opinion, as it was so protracted and its outcome so muddy. Poor ship design and some sloppy practises with explosives meant the British came off worse in terms of casualties, so arguably the Germans won the day. However, the (smaller) German Navy realised that it had only survived through luck, and basically stayed in port for the rest of the war, whereas the British were out sailing in force less than a week later and continuing the blockade of Germany. The Germans eventually thought the only way to win at sea was unrestricted submarine warfare, which turned out to be perhaps the biggest PR disaster in history. I was astonished to realise that the German Navy's inferiority complex from Jutland persisted into WWII: the German Navy stalled shamelessly when asked to help invade Britain, as the lesson they learnt from Jutland was that the British Navy could never be defeated, so what was the point of trying? So Jutland had complex long-term effects that defy easy classification. Which is, perhaps, why it's so fascinating.]