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Re:Paul Krugman: Partying Like It’s 1929 by yummyfajitas on Saturday March 22, 2008 @09:49AM (#143289)
Paul Krugman is very confusing. It's almost like he is trying to fool people who don't understand the difference between savings and loan banks and investment banks ("shadow" banks, in his lingo).

The problem in 1930 was that depositors at savings and loan banks all wanted their money back simultaneously. Many people (read: main street) got screwed, leading to the creation of the FDIC. I.e., "the bank doesn't have your money. Sorry."

The problem today is that savings and loan banks gave out a bunch of loans to low quality borrowers. They then sold these loans to investment banks while misleading them about the quality (and the IB's just figured it out). "Conventional" banks (the ones PK seems to think are so great) screwed the "shadow" banks (those scary unregulated ones), and now investors are trying to avoid risky investments until things clear up.

Both are scary in a "trouble on wall street [financial word] [financial word] bad for the economy [financial word] [financial word]" sense. But beyond that, the situation is rather different.

Re:Paul Krugman: Partying Like It’s 1929 by giardini on Saturday March 22, 2008 @01:24PM (#143423)
Hogwash.

The problems lie squarely with the investment banks and firms who (1) failed to perform due diligence in their en mass purchases of morgages and (2) who sorted those mortgages into hi-, medium-, and low-risk "tranches" and then sold each tranch to other firms as Collateralized Mortgage Options (CMOs). The fault also lies with the bond rating firms who gave incorrect ratings to the CMOs so created.

To add to this morass, some investment firms bought up multiple hi-risk CMOs, then combined and re-tranched them into second-tier hi-, medium-, and low-risk tranches! They then somehow got high ratings for these second-tier CMOs from the bond rating firms!

Sure, savings and loans were giving out loans w/o checking properly, but had the investment firms been performing proper due diligence, the savings and loans would not have been able to sell them and the problem would not have occurred.

And since the concentration of leverage occured at the investment bank/firm level and only due to their creation of CMOs and meta-CMOs, they bear the responsibility for this snafu.

Unfortunately, all this makes no difference. The taxpayer will bail out the rich investment banks, the dollar will continue to weaken, our capital will be used up to protect large investment firms and less capital will be available for productive uses by small and large firms.

Wall Street wins and Main Street loses once again.

Re:Paul Krugman: Partying Like It’s 1929 by yummyfajitas on Saturday March 22, 2008 @02:17PM (#143456)
I agree completely about bailouts, they are ridiculous. Bear should be allowed to fail. That will teach the IB's to do a better job next time.

But I disagree with you that IB's didn't do their due diligence. Measuring the quality of individual mortgages isn't their job. The IB's job here is to build securities out of individual mortgages, given accurate knowledge of the mortgages from the ratings agencies and local banks.

It's a lot like trading commodities. A market maker in commodities doesn't need to know what a grade A cow looks like or how a cattle auction works. His job is to trust the cow raters to do their job while he packages sets of cows into financial futures. If a rancher is colluding with a cattle appraiser to pretend that 1000 mad cows are Grade A beef, it's not the fault of commodities traders (although commodities traders will be hurt).

The flaw with the mortgage market was not happening on the IB's end. The individual mortgages were not of the quality the local banks promised for various reasons you've outlined. They were then packaged into securities which were suitable only for higher quality loans. Those securities are failing now, and the market has become a lemon market (which killed liquidity) and caused all sorts of other problems.

Investment banks: "Given loans of known quality, we can package them into bond-like securities."

Local banks: "Pray, Mr. Investment Banker. If you put into the package loans of the wrong quality, will the right security come out?"

(With apologies to charles babbage)

Re:Paul Krugman: Partying Like It’s 1929 by giardini on Monday March 24, 2008 @03:31PM (#144906)
The investment banks didn't have to evaluate all mortgages: they should have been _sampling_ those mortgages and evaluating the firms that supplied them with mortgages however. The wise firm that did would have anticipated problems well in advance.

And it was the IBs' responsibility when they retranched high-risk CMO's into 2nd-tier CMOs and then got those CMOs certified by the bond firms as good as gold. That was criminal, in fact, and charges should be filed against the IBs and the bond rating firms as appropriate.

Re:Paul Krugman: Partying Like It’s 1929 by maximilian on Sunday March 23, 2008 @03:06PM (#144055)
I don't feel like the fed is bailing out Bear so that I can continue, its just giving hope to all the stuff it owns and more importantly, to those it owes. If bear gets bought by JPMorgan, Bear is still screwed. They are gone for all intents and purposes, just their investments and debts live on, which IMHO, is a good thing. I feel that the i-bankers already feel like idiots and will have learned their lesson just in this whole mess, whether or not their company tanks.
Re:Paul Krugman: Partying Like It’s 1929 by pstuart on Saturday March 22, 2008 @12:50PM (#143396)
I would have liked to see some recommendations rather than just hand-wringing.

My understanding is the crux of problem was the arm-twisting that went into having the ratings agencies grade them as low risk (make it look pretty if you want our business in the future).

I would think that the best "free market" solution would be increased transparency and tools to get these transactions out of the shadows.