From the article:

> When AMT is enabled, all network packets are redirected to the Intel Management Engine and from there to the AMT. The packets bypass the OS completely. The vulnerable management features were made available in some but not all Intel chipsets starting in 2010, Embedi has said.

The vulnerability is in AMT, not ME (though I agree that the ME is an unnecessary security risk, and am well behind the current research to disable it).

AMT's an optional component of the ME, it's the part that enables remote management, and it's a flaw in AMT that they're describing. It seems reasonable to talk about the part that has a problem (although it wouldn't have been unreasonable for them to mention that it's part of the IME, of course).

I quote: "When AMT is enabled, all network packets are redirected to the Intel Management Engine"

As far as I know, it's only doing this for the primary (on-chip) network interface. /Never/ use the primary NIC if you have a Intel CPU.

Which is wrong, by the way. What actually happens is that a filter is installed on the NIC that redirects some packets (those addressed to the ME).