That's the point. Theoretical limitations has no bearing on solving the practical problem. That is why RichardHeart's original point [1] is wrong.
[1] The halting problem states you can't predict what a turing complete program will do, until you run it. This means to some degree, that you can't predict what your "smart" contract will do, until it does it. Thus turing completeness causes security to be far, far harder than non turing completeness. This is how you lose the millions of dollars as the DAO did after it passed audits.
Formal verification will be necessary in practice. This is not an ideal outcome either, since (1) you have to formally specify the problem you're trying to solve and (2) the proof that the code meets the specification can easily be bigger than the program, by many orders of magnitude. Even this does not guarantee that bugs won't happen, since there's no guarantee that your specification accurately describes the problem you're solving.