I use JuiceSSH [0] on Android, which is based around mosh-client. It works great... What precisely do you mean by the above?
OCB should be far more widely used than it is.
Meanwhile, configurable "cipher schemes" have in practice been a disaster. They are, for instance, the reason we still have RC4 in TLS today, despite knowing for almost 2 decades now that RC4 is broken.
If TLS had hard-coded RC4 with no alternatives, how would we be better off?
Having a bunch of ciphersuites, all believed at the time of their inclusion to be strong, just maximizes the attack surface of the protocol. Having ciphersuite negotiation at all practically guarantees that interoperability will require lowest-common-denominator security.
* https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11612615
Make that 5 years and counting.
Isn't OCB an open standard? https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7253.txt
Nobody wants to involve expensive lawyers, so for many folks that rules out OCB.
Mosh is a great idea, but by connecting it to OCB, the authors completely stalled more widespread adoption. That, and like you said, the complete lack of protocol spec.
Phillip Rogaway holds patents relevant to OCB. See the following for his patent grant: http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/ocb/grant.htm
I think this is the primary reason why there are still no alternative clients. And specifically, no good Mobile clients.
The reliance on OCB is unfortunate. I wish the Mosh developers would introduce multiple cipher schemes so that people can move away from OCB.
Unfortunately the protocol is also pretty poorly designed, with no easy backward compatible way to do this.
For example, when a client starts a session, the server prints "MOSH CONNECT 60001 sdmDrHqo8DBdpKxtAFAUyw" where the last part is the OCB key. It should have been prefixed with the ciper type for extensibility, but it is not. So this would need a backward incompatible redesign to get it going.