Sorry, this is completely wrong FUD. Paolo Bonzini and I work at Red Hat and there is constant review of the QEMU codebase, both for code quality and security issues. Furthermore devices in RHEL are whitelisted. TCG ("cross-platform emulation") is not involved at all when you're using KVM. A newly written emulator would just have a new set of vulnerabilities. When you don't know what you're talking about, please just don't.
Re:VM Escape: QEMU Case Study
by peterwwillis on Friday April 28, 2017 @05:04PM
(#14223034)
I'm glad to hear that! When did you implement fuzzing coverage? After the 2016 Qemu mailing list article I read where they're asking someone to look into applying to Google's oss fuzzing project? And how does your whitelisted set compare to Xen's stripped-down qemu support?
I'm actually fuzzing qemu's block device layer as we speak.
From the latest run:
│ run time : 11 days, 23 hrs, 12 min, 49 sec │ cycles done : 0 │
│ last new path : 0 days, 12 hrs, 55 min, 7 sec │ total paths : 364 │
│ last uniq crash : none seen yet │ uniq crashes : 0 │
│ last uniq hang : 0 days, 4 hrs, 4 min, 36 sec │ uniq hangs : 2 │
Re the comparison with Xen's qemu, you can grab the sources for RHEL's qemu-kvm and qemu-kvm-rhev packages and examine the driver whitelists, patches and ./configure line yourself.
Xen uses a stripped-down QEMU to boot unpatched guest OSes. However, even Xen doesn't test its qemu-xen components extensively. Writing a new purpose-built emulator (assuming you know what you're doing) is a better idea.
edit: Or use PV guests, and skip all potential QEMU flaws.