Fair points! I don't disagree, and also think what we can find in common is that effort is usually a precursor to execution. As in, it's not easy to make laminated / official looking ID type things. The whole "Fake IDs" thing that is always a reasonable market - they don't have to be great, they just have to be good enough, right?

So that's the flip side, an escalation in confidence factor - oh this is new and it's not as exploitable! - is perfectly reasonable at first. I'm not trying to be sarcastic about this, but I remember reading that some crew found an exploit in pacemaker protocols (e.g. connectivity) that could be manipulated if a person had bad intentions. Who sits around and tries to figure out that kind of stuff?

Oh, right, guys like me sitting in their garage. Spiritual kin of Woz.

My kidding-but-not-really musing is that I've been an employee of 12+ different companies in my life, and I've seen how things work in practical terms.

The biggest security penetration vector that can't be digitized is human behavior, because if you act like you belong and your badge looks like you belong, yippee! Now you've got physical access, and that's 9/10s of any penetration objective. I mean, if I was a KGB agent, that's how I'd think about these things...