Re:Phishing attack uses Unicode characters in domains to clo...
by usrusr on Saturday April 15, 2017 @07:20AM
(#14120305)
The least-impact visualisation could be using colors: group the characters in the domain name by script family, then use regular colors for the largest group (so that e.g. an all-Korean domain name would look just fine) and highlight those exotic relative to the rest.
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Re:Phishing attack uses Unicode characters in domains to clo...
by beaconstudios on Saturday April 15, 2017 @07:46AM
(#14120380)
or maybe just disallow mixed-charset domains. After all there's not much use for a domain that's partially Cyrillic and partially Latin. Not that I'm aware of anyway - and the rule could be more granular if there are legit uses.
Re:Phishing attack uses Unicode characters in domains to clo...
by krallja on Saturday April 15, 2017 @10:17AM
(#14120788)
see https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14120372 - this example uses all-Cyrillic
Re:Phishing attack uses Unicode characters in domains to clo...
by beaconstudios on Saturday April 15, 2017 @08:38PM
(#14123700)
the point is that is reduces the number of potential variations. There would only be 1 or 2 possible visually-identical phishing domains for any latin domain, as opposed to potentially hundreds or thousands as it stands now.